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B-H: Article on Outcome of 17-18 Feb Rome Summit

BR2102155296 Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Claire Trean: "Rome Meeting Dispels Bosnian Peace Threats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rome—"We have avoided a crisis," Richard Holbrooke, U.S. negotiator of the Dayton agreement for Bosnia, said at the end of the meeting between the leading protagonists in the former Yugoslav conflict held in Rome on 17 and 18 February. He continued: "We ironed out the problems that have emerged on the road to peace and perhaps eliminated some of them altogether. This was the first test for the Dayton agreement and we have won through. It was not easy." At the end of the talks in Rome, bitter as ever between the three warring parties, Richard Holbrooke can leave the U.S. Department of State and the Bosnian affair with the feeling of having done a good job, albeit an incomplete one: Even if, once again, and as he himself states, the hardest thing remains transforming what was agreed upon paper in Rome into reality, the "peace process" of which he was the leading architect is now back on the rails after dangerous tensions had emerged.

The path toward peace cannot be anything but chaotic in Bosnia. Thus, the most important result of the Rome meeting is doubtless the desire expressed by the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian presidents to continue to talk to each other and their renewed commitment to implement the Dayton agreement. For the time being, this is in everyone's best interests, even if they all have their own ulterior motives. Mixed meetings with the military and civilian representatives of the different communities in Bosnia were to resume on 19 February with a meeting on board the George Washington aircraft carrier. Messrs. Izetbegovic and Milosevic, who met at length in Rome on Saturday, even agreed to see each other again in one month's time and then regularly thereafter.

Difficulties had been mounting in recent weeks, giving the feeling of an inexorable deterioration: the refusal of the Serbian districts of Sarajevo to be integrated into a reunified town under Bosnian control; the boycotting by some of the Bosnian Serb leaders of all of the meetings with the Implementation Force [IFOR] and the Bosnians as set out in the Dayton agreement because of the arrest of the officers accused of war crimes; the Bosnian authorities' challenging of IFOR and the Belgrade leadership for their refusal to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague with regard to the war criminals; and the significant rise in tension between the Croats and Muslims in Mostar, which has endangered the Croatian-Muslim federation and, as a result, the whole peace plan.

Vitamins

The most spectacular success of the Rome meeting is the agreement finally hammered out for Mostar, after two days and two nights of uninterrupted negotiations to which the West decided on Sunday evening [18 February], at the last minute, to invite the town's two Croatian and Bosnian mayors. One Western diplomat said at the end of the meeting: "Never has Franjo Tudjman been under such pressure." The Croatian president was criticized for supporting the Herzegovina extremists, who, for months, have been constantly blocking the efforts of Mostar's European administrator Hans Koschnick to reunify the town. An agreement was concluded on the delimitation of the districts of the town belonging to either side and of the central, mixed zone. The refugees' right to return home was again declared as was the right of the inhabitants to circulate freely, something that should take effect as of 20 February. Mr. Koschnick, if he wishes, will remain the EU's on-site representative, and his mandate has been renewed for six months "at the request" of the protagonists. The underlying disagreement felt to exist between the Europeans and the Americans who felt that things were not progressing fast enough in Mostar has since subsided: Richard Holbrooke recently spoke of Mr. Koschnick in glowing terms. He said in Rome that all that was needed was to inject some "vitamins" into the process of restoring the peace in Herzegovina.

The ways and means of the reunification of Sarajevo, which have already been the subject of a recent agreement, were stressed again and, in particular, the role of the mixed police force that has been created along the same lines as in Mostar. Here again, we will really measure the sincerity of intentions on the ground in the next few days, especially where freedom of circulation is concerned. In Rome, the Bosnian leaders as well as the Serbian president and the Bosnian Serbs' "prime minister" called on the inhabitants of the Serbian districts not to desert the town. The joint declaration stated: "We call on each person to remain in the town where his legitimate rights will be upheld."

A lot more went unsaid and remained ambiguous on the subject of alleged war criminals. The methods used in arresting the suspects were, of course, set out in such a way (before Rome, during Richard Holbrooke's last tour of the region) that the hunt for suspects would not turn into "hostage-taking," something the Serbs say they fear. All arrests must be approved by the International War Crimes Tribunal [IWCT] in The Hague. But, although the parties involved reiterated in Rome their commitment to cooperate with the IWCT, Slobodan Milosevic has not budged an inch on this matter. At the news conference, Richard Holbrooke was unable to detail anything whatsoever that would show that the international community is exerting greater pressure on the Serbian president. As for Croatia, which is expected to extradite six nationals wanted by the IWCT, its leaders have apparently limited themselves to once more promising that it will be done as soon as Croatian extradition laws have been amended.

Mr. Izetbegovic was undoubtedly in no position to make too many demands in Rome following IFOR's discovery of an Iranian training center as revealed the day before with wide media coverage. The Rome text, like the Dayton agreement, states that "all foreign forces" apart from IFOR must leave Bosnian territory "immediately." The French side was keen to explain just how embarrassing this matter was for the Americans, who are flaunting their plan to train and arm the Bosnian forces. "How will the U.S. Congress be able to agree to help an Army that includes these kinds of elements?" one member of the French delegation wondered with open satisfaction.

Albania: Serreqi, Granic View EU Integration, Kosovo

AU2202083796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Report by Aferdita Sokoli]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, arrived on a two-day official visit to our country this afternoon. Granic was received at Rinas Airport by Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi and other top Foreign Ministry functionaries. Both countries' ambassadors Kroqi and Yuricic were also present.

Official talks between Serreqi and Granic were held this evening as well. At the end of talks, both ministers gave statements to the press:

[Begin recording] [Granic in English with superimposed Albanian translation] Albania and Croatia are two friendly countries. We discussed bilateral and multilateral relations today, as well as the European integration of our two countries. Regarding bilateral relations, we spoke openly about the political issues between the two countries. We were improving the economic relations in the meantime, but the war in our region had very strong effects on our economic exchanges. We discussed some concrete projects today and we will continue tomorrow.

We maintain the same views regarding European integration. We are very interested in our integration in the European Union [EU], NATO, and the Council of Europe, and are expecting to become a Council of Europe member during the first part of this year. We favor integration into the EU on an individual basis, according to similar standards for all European countries. Croatia, in particular, is not ready to take part in any regional association. Both countries support the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Mostar agreement. Regarding Slavonia, we are optimistic about its peaceful integration. Croatia supports the territorial integrity of all the countries of the region and strongly backs all the rights of minorities in all regional countries, including here the presence of observers.

[Serreqi] This was a very important meeting, particularly for the time it was being held. We are two friendly countries, two countries that have common interests in the region, two countries interested in a just solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

At today's meeting, a very important place was occupied by the situation in former Yugoslavia, particularly the fast developments after Dayton and the Rome meeting. Of course, we voiced the position of the Albanian Government and diplomacy regarding the crisis, the situation, and the problem of Albanians in former Yugoslavia, singling out the situation in Kosovo.

Considering the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be the most tragic part of the crisis, we singled out the situation in Kosovo to be a fundamental element of the crisis without whose solution there can be no peace and a definitive solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly, we cannot reduce the problem of Albanians in Kosovo to simply a problem of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Undoubtedly, we cannot reconcile with the thesis that it is Serbia's internal affair. On the contrary, it is a much broader problem that may bring about a greater destabilization than has been thought so far. In this case, we drew the attention that the international community and the friendly countries should help in this direction in order to include the problem of Albanians in Kosovo on the agenda of every forum, in order to find a negotiated solution. We also favor a solution without violence, respecting the inviolability of borders and, at the same time, the right of Albanians to self-determination.

We also discussed in detail the possibilities of a more intensive bilateral cooperation, as well as cooperation in the economic field and the great possibilities for fruitful development in the field of culture, health, transportation, facilities in the circulation of citizens, and so forth.

Regarding regional activity, we discussed the Albanian Government's goodwill to be a factor of peace and stability in the region, simultaneously preserving some features so that Albania in no way accepts regional solutions by ignoring the fact that Serbia and Montenegro cannot integrate the regional initiatives in the international structures without giving clear signs of goodwill, testifying that it is ready to solve the situation in Kosovo in an acceptable way. In this direction, we are very clear and determined that we are against Serbia's unconditioned integration into international structures.

Regarding European integration, it is very evident that both countries consider European integration an absolute priority. We see the integration in many levels, in the euro-atlantic collective security structures, and in economic and political ones. In this direction, Albania is very straightforward and convinced that it has chosen the right road and it will follow it, of course, by respecting the peculiarities and claiming to be integrated as a country with the full dignity of its own nation. [end recording]

Albania: Meksi Meets With Croatia's Granic

LD2202155696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the second day of his official and return visit to Albania, Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Croatia, was received by the Albanian prime minister, Aleksander Meksi.

Economic relations between the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Croatia lag behind political ones, Minister Granic said after his talks with his Albanian counterpart, Dr. Alfred Serreqi. The trade between the two countries is inadequate, Granic said adding that, however, some progress had been made, especially in cooperation between small and medium-sized firms.

So far Croatia and Albania have signed 12 agreements, including seven economic ones, but the implementation of some of them is not going as smoothly as it should. Of special importance is the ferry service between Rijeka and Durres, which was in operation even when there was no relevant agreement between the two countries but which was discontinued due to circumstances in November 1994.

Minister Granic and I talked about this topic and agreed on the resumption of this service. Through Durres, Albania maintains links with all Adriatic and Mediterranean ports and we want the same kind of links with Croatian ports, Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi said after the talks. He said that his country now had a larger range of goods than before for export to Croatia and that this was a valid reason for the ferry service to resume again soon.

Best prospects for economic cooperation between Albania and Croatia exit in the construction industry, agriculture, tourism, and food production and processing, Prime Minister Meksi said. There is also great potential for cooperation in the oil industry, especially in view of the fact that INA [Croatian oil company] is already present in Albania, the Albanian prime minister said.

Minister Granic and Prime Minister Meksi talked in the presence of their respective delegations and agreed on setting up a joint Albanian-Croatian commission with the task of assessing overall economic potentials and ways of cooperation between the two countries.

Albania: Berisha, UK's Rifkind View Relations, Kosovo

AU2202140496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Report by Reis Cico; Rifkind statements in English with superimposed Albanian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind arrived on a visit to our country lasting several hours. At Rinas airport, he was received by his counterpart Alfred Serreqi and Foreign Ministry representatives. Mr. Rifkind made the following statements for television:

[Begin recording] [Rifkind] This is my first visit to Albania. We are looking to the future with enthusiasm and seeking to develop good relations between the United Kingdom and Albania. Both sides will make some important statements today, which will show the importance we give to these relations. I am looking forward to meeting the president, my counterpart, and other government members.

[Cico] Will you discuss the Kosova issue?

[Rifkind] I am certain that this will be one of the points that we are to discuss. We will also focus on other problems related to the development of Albania in particular and the region in general. [end recording]

British Foreign Secretary Rifkind was received by President of the Republic Sali Berisha at the Presidency at noon today. Berisha and Rifkind held a tete-a-tete talk for 25 minutes. Berisha and Rifkind then gave press statements.

[Begin recording] [Berisha] I consider British Foreign Secretary Rifkind's visit to Albania to be a great event. This is a contribution to our friendly cooperation and will give a new impetus to our relations. We discussed bilateral relations with Mr. Rifkind. We are happy that the British Government, the taxpayers, and other institutions of this country are very generous in the assistance and the solidarity they have rendered us. We are seeing the possibility of developing bilateral relations in many fields. Political relations are very good. In other fields as well, we want relations to reach this level. I am pleased that the British Government has helped us with our economic reforms and technical assistance. Our relations are being expanded to the educational, military, and other fields. We have now laid a broad basis for our cooperation. Many British investors and serious companies are exercising their activity in Albania. I want to thank Prime Minister Major and his government for the encouragement given to the British investors to come and invest in Albania.

We also discussed the situation in the region. We fully support the Dayton agreement and the presence of IFOR [Implementation Force] troops and consider this to be a real factor of peace and stability that extinguishes the flames of war and creates a new climate for peace.

We discussed the Kosova issue with Mr. Rifkind. I am happy that Mr. Rifkind shared the same views. It is high time that the dialogue between Albanians and Belgrade be initiated in the presence of a third party. I am happy that the British Government is convinced that Belgrade should initiate a dialogue and Serbia's integration into the international community should be conditional on the solution to the Kosova issue.

[Cico] For his part, the British foreign secretary declared:

[Rifkind] I am happy to be in Tirana. This is a historic day in the history of relations between Albania and Britain, because today, for the first time, the British charge d'affaires will be a resident ambassador of the United Kingdom in Albania. And this is a clear indication that we are marching toward strengthening our relations. We believe that this range of relations will give a new form to our cooperation so that the British Government will render a greater constructive contribution to Albania on its road.

As the president stated, we are assisting the process of reforms in Albania and expect them to continue, as there is a lot of work to do. Our cooperation will continue in many fields. British companies have invested and will invest in Albania in the future. The European Union [EU] has devoted special attention to relations with Albania, so that Albania can recover economically and march toward prosperity.

I agree with the president regarding international issues. It is very important to see progress on the Kosova issue. Britain, just like other Western countries, has made it clear to President Milosevic that we should believe, and we do believe, in progress, in a progress important for the Kosova issue. This will make it possible for Belgrade to profit from relations with great financial institutions and in the relations with the EU. We share the same views on the Dayton agreement, which is yielding results. Possibilities should be explored on the Kosova issue as well. It is high time peace were reached for the people of Kosova and the region. We hope that the problems will be resolved in a satisfactory way. I am happy to be in Albania today. This is an important issue for our two countries and I hope that there is the goodwill and determination to further boost our bilateral relations. [end recording]

British Foreign Secretary Malcom Rifkind was also received by Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi.

The British foreign secretary left Albania today.

Albania: Further on Serreqi-Rifkind Meeting

AU2202082996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding the meeting of Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi and his British counterpart Malcolm Rifkind, here is an expanded report by the Foreign Ministry spokesman. Defense Minister Safet Zhulali also attended the meeting.

During the talks, they discussed Albanian-British relations, particularly the Kosova issue and the situation in the region under the conditions of the steps to implement the Dayton agreement. They also pointed out Albania's achievements, at both the domestic and international levels, and confirmed the European orientation of its foreign policy.

Within the framework of bilateral cooperation, they spoke about the fruitful cooperation with the Know How Fund in important directions of the economic reform in Albania. They put to the fore the interest shown by British companies in developing economic activity in our country, and focused on military relations between Albania and Britain. Besides the cooperation memorandum, a cooperation program has also been signed for 1996.

Focusing on the Kosova issue, the meeting underlined the need to examine and resolve this question with no delay through initiating dialogue and exerting pressure on the Belgrade authorities to engage them in this process.

Malcolm Rifkind, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, departed for London today.

Albania: Berisha Interviewed on Upcoming Elections

MS2202093496 London THE EUROPEAN in English 22-28 Feb 96 p 11

[Report by Ian Mather, including an interview with President Sali Berisha in Tirana; date not given—all names as published]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Albania may be Europe's poorest country, but, as a general Election nears, it is proving that the nation's politicians lack nothing when it comes to traditional campaign mud-slinging.

President Sali Berisha, whose Democratic Party faces a strong challenge from the Socialist Party composed of reformed communists, has been accused of locking up political opponents, muzzling the press, and meddling with the electoral law.

But Berisha knows how to give as good as he gets. In an exclusive interview with The European he made it clear that he feels he has nothing to apologise for.

The interview took place in the modest presidency building on Tirana's main boulevard. Next to the building stood lines of private kiosks and stalls, signalling the arrival of capitalism in a state that suffered nearly half a century of iron rule under communist dictator Enver Hoxa.

Elsewhere on the pavements men stood with their arms folded behind upended boxes, each displaying six bananas—clear evidence that food shortages still endure.

Several young men loitered near the iron gates of the presidency, looking as though they had strayed from the terraces of the football stadium down the road. They were paid lookouts, I was told. Berisha has many opponents.

Berisha himself, a charismatic and voluble man, has the disconcerting habit of calling you "sir" when he strongly disputes the thrust of a question. His most heated response was over the "genocide" law, passed by parliament last year, which bars all former leading communists from political activity until 2002.

The law has resulted in two opposition leaders and several Socialist MPs being taken out of political circulation on the basis of official files dating from the communist era. Fatos Nano, former prime minister and leader of the Socialist Party, continues to languish in prison on charges of embezzling Italian aid funds.

The law, which Berisha explained was based on a Czech law, excludes rank-and-file ex-communists, of which Berisha himself is one.

"The essential question is this, sir," Berisha declared. "Was there genocide in Albania or not? Documents show that in 45 years more than 400,000 people were jailed, tortured, prosecuted or killed in Albania."

He gave the example of a massacre at Tivar, now the port of Bar in Montenegro, after the Second World War when 8,500 young men who had fought against the Nazis but opposed communism were killed and buried in a common grave.

"Can you believe that the man who as the minister in charge of the secret police in Albania ordered killings in the city of Shkoder and in the streets of Tirana is now the secretary-general of the Socialist Party?

"Yet he is, sir. Mr Gramoz Ruci. They want to use their political status to protect themselves from crimes they have committed. This is not acceptable.

"Coming to the latest killings, in 1990 many young people were killed because they thought they were free to cross the borders. The opposite was true. Soldiers got rewarded for killing."

But why call it a "genocide" law, since genocide means the destruction of a race and that was not what had happened in Albania? "It was cultural genocide, sir. Do you know how many cultural institutions were destroyed? Two thousand churches and mosques blown up with dynamite.

Many of them dated from the beginning of this millennium and were among the oldest in the Balkans."

Berisha denied that any newspapers had been banned in an attempt to manipulate press coverage of the elections. What had happened, he said, was that the newspapers "did a trick".

Weekly newspapers were exempt from circulation tax, so daily newspapers—"including ones on our side"—registered as magazines on the grounds that at one time they had been weeklies even though they were now daily newspapers.

"They wanted to evade taxes. The ministry of finance wrote to them asking them to obey the law and declare themselves newspapers. That's all. They have just been obliged to declare themselves as they really are. Not one newspaper is banned in Albania. They are published every day, sir." Berisha added that he might try to use his influence to have the tax reduced, since he thought it was on the high side.

To prove that newspapers were not actually banned, an aide then produced a pile of them from behind his desk including an opposition newspaper, KOHA JONE, and pointed to that day's date on them. Unless they had gone to the trouble of printing special editions for my benefit, the evidence seemed conclusive.

But the charge of making changes to the electoral law is harder to assess. Albania's election rules are complicated, with most MPs being elected by majority voting and a smaller number by proportional representation.

Berisha denied that a law which lays down that parties with less than four per cent of the vote do not qualify for seats in the new parliament had been introduced by his party, which won office in 1992. He said the four per cent rule had existed before when the Socialists had been in power, and added that some other political parties had asked for it to remain.

But critics say a rule which slightly increases the number of MPs to be elected by majority voting could reduce the number of MPs from small parties, including the Human Rights Party, which represents the Greek minority.

Berisha refuted opposition accusations of dictatorship and said the elections would be fair. "The past is over and my country will always have fair and free elections. I am deeply convinced of that. We are a European country. Our policy is to be integrated into Europe. We are striving to join Nato and the EU. That is our stance."

There is widespread agreement on one issue [that] Albania may be Europe's poorhouse with a gross national product of less than $600 per head, but the country has made great strides since the early 1990s when the economy was in a state of collapse and large parts of the population were faced with starvation. International financial organisations, as well as Italy, the country that provides most support to Albania, are satisfied with the progress.

But the international human rights groups and the Council of Europe, which Albania joined last summer, have expressed some concern. So has the US government, which sees a stable Albania as vital for the Balkan region, and which uses the country as a base for its operations in the area. These parties will be watching the elections with great interest.

Albania: Berisha's Role in Election Campaign Criticized

AU2202101596 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 21 Feb 96 p 3

[Editorial: "Constitution Excludes Berisha"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Nowhere in the constitutional provisions does it state the president is forbidden to lead the electoral campaign of the party he represents," announced Tirana Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Brojka yesterday, naively defending Berisha's imposition of himself on the PD four weeks ago. At the suggestion of "foreigners," who will of course not vote for Berisha, Berisha jumped in to impose himself as the leader of the PD's electoral campaign at the most critical moment of his struggle with Meksi. It is not that this proposal came from "outside" the presidency, but the move seems to be an imposition, considering the state of the PD's internal democracy. Meanwhile, our sort-of constitution and sort-of democracy reinforce this impression. According to the Constitutional Law, "The president of the republic represents the unity of the entire Albanian people." While it is true that the constitutional dispositions do not state that the president of the republic cannot lead the electoral campaign of the party he represents, Article 24 of these dispositions excludes the republic's president from the campaign. This is by virtue of the fact that the concept of "the unity of the entire people" extends to the opposition, against whom the president would have to position himself during the campaign. This is where the PD chairman for Tirana shows his naivety when he says that "President Berisha has been PD chairman, and he therefore cannot be separated from the PD campaign." He thus cites as an argument in defense of this constitutional imposition a fan's emotional reaction in favor of his idol, which has no connection with legal principles. If one remembers what the PD is like, this reaction also becomes morally reprehensible. Brojka was brought onto the public stage when he was mentioned as a candidate for the post of PD chairman after the putsch that eliminated the now-vanished PD Chairman Eduart Selami, whom Brojka and other members of the Berisha fan club naturally exclude from the campaign of the PD, even though he used to be its chairman. Before that moment, nobody in Tirana, let alone Albania, had heard of Brojka. The idol Berisha has at least created this opportunity for his fan.

Czech Republic: Klaus Condemns CSSD's Attitude

AU2102155996 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 17 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: "The CSSD's Bizarre Demagogic Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The social democrats, spearheaded by their chairman, Milos Zeman, have probably already decided that their selfish party electoral interests are paramount and, therefore, that it is to their benefit to take the liberty of misusing anything—no matter what it costs our country and its international standing.

The most recent example of this irresponsibility is demagogic activity endeavoring to take advantage of the problems accompanying the negotiations on the text of the joint Czech-German declaration and of the debate taking place on both sides on this complicated and very sensitive issue. The Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] wants to feed off them before the elections. There were times when both the president and the foreign minister were assured of the social democrats' loyal stance in this issue. Deputies Gross and Wagner demonstrated this change in attitude more than clearly during the parliamentary interpellations.

Our relations with Germany are, whether we like it or not, burdened by the past, but this is not holding back their current extraordinarily positive development in all spheres of interhuman cooperation to an extent probably never seen in our history. In its attempt to seek a full-stop to the tragic past of World War II and the things associated with it, the government (and the governing coalition) is guided primarily by its responsibility for our country's future. Therefore, it proceeds thoroughly from protection for our national and state interests. Some of the difficulties in the current negotiations on the Czech-German declaration ensue, quite logically, from this firm stance. We are formulating our own stances and are promoting them decisively, calmly, and responsibly, and I would like to point out again that we will continue to promote them regardless of the heckling from the extremists in both countries. It is a pity (but, at the same time, perhaps also a revelation for everyone) that one of our parliamentary parties is adding to this.

I would like to state categorically that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has never in any talks with the Czech side cast doubt on the outcome of World War II and that the Czech side would not put up with any talks pursuing this objective. I suppose this is known to all of those who want to know it.

I consider, within the framework of not dramatizing mutual relations, the recent comment by German Foreign Minister Kinkel about the Potsdam Agreement to be an accidental slip of the tongue (this really did not happen in my presence), and I would suggest to everyone, on both sides, that they let this slip pass by in silence. The Potsdam Agreement (no matter that Mr. Neubauer continues to describe it derisively as the Potsdam protocols) was a deliberate decision made by the victors over the vanquished after World War II and, although the vanquished side could not have been pleased about it at that time (and probably cannot even now), it was—and is—a fact. The situation that arose at that time cannot be changed without another victory or defeat.

Attempting to alter the past is to no [illegible] because it happened long ago, and the signature[illegible]derneath this or that document cannot into the b[illegible]gain—with the passing of half a century—be erased. It is possible to go forward and look ahead, but it is nonsense to try to begin rewriting or doubting today documents that have been valid for half a century and have had an affect on our lives.

I do concede one thing: It is better not to talk about them. And it is better to forget them. Leave them in the history books because the status quo is and must remain the starting point for the future. Therefore, we quite resolutely reject the attempts to alter the current situation, without hysteria and without marginal party interests, but all the more firmly.

For all of these reasons it is necessary to condemn the CSSD's attempts to damage the ongoing difficult Czech-German negotiations, to damage our relations with Germany, and to damage our country's overall international standing by its nationalistic tune, to which the proposed parliamentary debates on Potsdam or the false and demagogic statements by Mr. Zeman about the failure of the coalition parties to protect our interests are contributing. The CSSD is again demonstrating that responsibility for our country's future is alien to it. Its chairman, Milos Zeman, and his colleagues are willing to sacrifice everything to their pursuit of a couple of votes. At a meeting with the citizens of Plzen on 10 February, I protested against the attempt to maneuver the Czech-German issue into the party political dimension. This is a matter for all of us; in keeping with this, it has to remain apolitical and, therefore, above or outside the election campaign.

We have a duty to hand over our country to our children at least in the shape in which we inherited it from our parents. Not a square meter smaller and not a bit less sovereign. No negative change in this respect must follow on from the current Czech-German discussion or from the current, occasionally oversimplified, Pan-European unionist plans (often prompted by the German side). As opposed to Mr. Zeman, this is exactly what we are striving for.

Slovakia: Kovac Jr Witness Disputes SIS Information

AU2102132196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 17 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "pt": "Oskar F.: SIS Information Is Not True"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—"The information that I was dismissed from service with the Slovak Information Service [SIS] on 22 September 1995 is not true because I worked late into the night that day and no one notified me of my dismissal," former SIS member Oskar F. told SME in an interview. He was reacting to the SIS statement [of 15 February] that he had been dismissed from the secret service on 22 September 1995 and only two days later, on 24 September 1995, decided to testify before the investigator. Oskar F. stated in this context: "On Saturday, 23 September 1995, Peter C., the head of my group, left a message on my answering machine at home telling me to come to work on Sunday. On that Sunday, 24 September 1995, I testified before Major Vacok on the real circumstances of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction. On Monday, 25 September 1995, they went to see my girlfriend and asked her why I did not go to work. Later, they also went after my father and kept asking him my whereabouts.

"They would leave written messages for me in the door, asking me to come to work. They cannot have dismissed me from the SIS on 22 September 1995 because they did not take away my service pass."

According to information available to the daily SME, on Sunday, 24 September 1995, the SIS surveillance section shadowed Peter Vacok, the then investigator of the Michal Kovac Jr. case, in Bratislava-Borik. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Hungarians Unveil Two Territorial Division Plans

AU2102212096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 19 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "rej": "Hungarian Coalition Has Come Up With Two Proposals for Territorial and Administrative Arrangement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The three parties of the Hungarian Coalition (MK) agreed last week on two common proposals for territorial and administrative arrangement. The first is a reaction to the current government proposal and divides Slovakia into eight regions [kraje] and 94 districts [okresy]. It had been drawn up in the form of a draft law and was submitted to the Ministry of Interior on 16 February. The second proposal is based on the counties variant. It divides the Slovak Republic into 16 counties [zupy] and 121 districts (which correspond to the current subdistricts [obvody]). It will be submitted to parliament if the government turns down the MK's first proposal. Under the first proposal, the virtually entire territory of southern Slovakia is incorporated into the South Slovakia region [Juhoslovensky Kraj]. It is made up of the districts of Senec, Samorin, Dunajska Streda, Galanta, Velky Meder, Sala, Nove Zamky, Komarno, Hurbanovo, Sturovo, Zeliezovce, Levice, Vrable, Sahy, Lucenec, Filakovo, Rimavska Sobota, Tornala, Roznava, Moldava nad Bodvou, Velke Kapusany, and Kralovsky Chlmec. The other regions essentially respect the government's proposal, except that the Nitra and Trnava regions, with the exception of the districts incorporated into the South Slovakia region, are merged into a single entity. In a report that provides the rationale for this proposal, the MK refers to international documents that ban changes in the ethnic composition of the population in areas inhabited by people belonging to ethnic minorities. The MK's second proposal divides the same territory into three counties. In all of the proposed entities in southern Slovakia, members of the Hungarian minority are to constitute the majority. According to P. Farkas, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, the ethnic principle was not the only criterion given consideration. Coexistence Deputy Chairman J. Kvarda admitted that the proposal is based on the so-called Komarno documents [venue of meeting of representatives of Hungarian minority in January 1994]. It differs from them in that Hungarian-populated villages around Nitra are incorporated into the South Slovakia region. There are also some other changes in incorporating villages at the border of this region. In the opinion of L. Gyurovszky, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS], the MK's common proposal bears little semblance to the proposal OS put forward in January. It is thus a great compromise on the part of MOS.

[The Hungarian Coalition's proposal for a new territorial and administrative arrangement is also the subject of a 500-word commentary by Ondrej Dostal entitled "Return to Komarno" in Bratislava SME in Slovak on 19 February on page 4. Dostal regrets that, under the MK's proposal, "some natural entities (Gemer, Novohrad, Tekov, Hont) are being divided with the same lack of sensitivity that is characteristic of the government's proposal" and that "the Hungarian parties are returning to the preferment of the ethnic principle and are thereby isolating themselves."]

Slovakia: Constitutional Court Rules Against Parliament

96CH0035B Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 16 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by Daniel Borsky: "Court Buries Parliamentary Investigations"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The governing coalition probably would rather forget the last three days of November, when the judicial branch displayed its independence in two consecutive rulings. First, the Supreme Court ruled that the Ministry of Finance acted illegally when it took away the license from the PSIS [expansion not given] investment fund earlier this year (see story, page 1). A few days later, the Constitutional Court decided that investigative commissions created by parliament run against the Constitution.

The latter decision put an end to a commission chaired by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia's (HZDS) Dusan Macuska investigating whether the events leading to a parliamentary no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's second government were unconstitutional. While it also pulled the plug on a universally-populated parliamentary investigation into the mysterious and controversial death of Alexander Dubcek, arguments that ensued in the wake of the court's ruling overshadowed fallout over the Slovak leader who led the 1968 reforms known as the "Prague Spring."

Ernest Valko, an attorney and the last chairman of Czechoslovakia's federal Constitutional Court, said the decision holds tight to fundamental democratic tenets. "I am very glad to see judges realize their independent status, which often takes a lot of personal courage. It is very important for preserving democracy and a legal state."

Coalition representatives complained it was democracy in partisan clothing. "For me it's evidence that partisanship is the working method of the constitutional court," parliament's vice-chairman Augustin Marian Huska said. "It's unacceptable that the Constitutional Court can decide how parliament should create its own organs," said the HZDS's Huska. "The parliament is the highest law-making body in Slovakia."

"I was not happy with the decision because it doesn't seem objective to me," Macuska said. "I will respect it, but only after it comes into force next month. Until then, our commission will continue its work."

Perhaps Macuska had a personal reason for his grievance, for he said his commission was very close to wrapping its work up. "I still wonder about decision's timing," he said. "In the same month that our commission was to publish its findings, the court made its ruling."

Besides, Macuska pointed out, ever since 1991, various other investigative commissions had worked in parliament and nobody had objected to them. "Only in the case of this commission, 43 MPs asked for a court ruling because they didn't like it," he grumbled.

The parliament's right to create investigative committees was established in 1991, when two parties—the Public Against Violence (VPN) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)—wanted to set up a commission to look into Vladimir Meciar's activities at the Ministry of Interior in 1990. Twenty seven KDH MPs voted in favor of the proposal. "It's interesting that these parliamentarians argued (then) that such a power is common in democratic parliaments and is inevitable for preserving a legal state," said Macuska. "I call it a paradox because in many cases these parliamentarians were the same ones who appealed to the constitutional court this year. And not one of them gave any reason for such a major switch of viewpoints."

Valko, a MP for VPN in the federal parliament in 1991, admitted to the contradiction. "Let's be honest. Both of the commissions—from 1991 and the one in today's parliament—had a clear political background. But a parliamentary commission is always political. In the American Congress a committee is always set up to judge the political responsibility of a state official."

Ivan Simko, a KDH vice-chairman, was among those MPs who appealed to the court. He said deputies took advantage of an opportunity that has always been there. "There was no Slovak Constitution back in 1991," he said. "The old communist federal constitution was in power and the whole constitutional framework was different. If parliament's decision (in 1991) was against that constitution, somebody could have appealed to the federal constitutional court, but nobody did."

Constitutional Court judge Jan Drgonec told the daily PRAVDA that this recent case's background was more interesting than the actual legality of it. "In this case, the law that was on the books before the Slovak Constitution was passed contradicted it as soon as the Constitution came into force," Orgonec said. Macuska accepted this explanation but argued, "How come nobody found out about this contradiction before? The Constitution has been around for more than 3 years."

Macuska's commission, Simko stressed, was a problem from another jar. "It became crystal clear that this regulation was being misused for political goals," he said. "The commission not only summoned regular citizens, it even subpoenaed them to testify. That was the actual reason for our appeal. Such a commission must not force a citizen to testify, because it infringes on his individual freedoms."

Valko added that Macuska's committee overstepped legal bounds under the guise of operating within the country's criminal code. "This particular commission often defended itself by the criminal code, especially those regulations about summoning citizens and fining them if they refused to show up," Valko said, citing a specific incident when former MP Gabriela Kaliska was fined 20,000 Sk when she refused to show up before Macuska's panel. "By doing that, the commission made itself unconstitutional," Valko added. Meanwhile, Kaliska announced after the court's ruling she and another former MP, Milan Janicina, will sue committee members for abusing the powers of a public authority.

There is another reason why Macuska is unhappy with the decision. "The parliament's oversight powers has been shrunk even further," the HZDS deputy said. "Now it can control even fewer things than it used to." But Valko disagreed, saying, "Of course it can, but it has to avoid trying to replace prosecution and judicial courts."

Slovakia: Government Bill on Foundations Criticized

96CH0039A Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 30 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Richard Lewis: "Foundations Face Redefinition"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Not long before Christmas, Pavol Demes said he received a copy of a bill on foundations that the Ministry of Justice had prepared. Though he is the head of the Gremium of the Third Sector, the organization that represents foundations and other non-profit entities in Slovakia, Demes said he was caught completely by surprise by the government's proposal. But he said he didn't need to read much of it to form an opinion.

"I didn't need to go further than the first paragraph of the bill," Demes said, "to know that its intentions were bad."

What Demes, the Gremium and many of the foundations that body represents see is a government-led proposal to rein in foundations and put them under the watchful eye of the state. "I see this bill as an attempt to get the citizen back under state control," said Demes, who is also the head of President Michal Kovac's office of international relations. "If they (government officials) do not respect an individual's freedom to act, I don't know what they will respect."

The bill's drafters argue otherwise. They insist that the government has no intention to control foundations or bring politics into the whole issue, they're just refining what foundations are and weeding out those that don't meet the bill's requirements. Chief among these is a requirement that a foundation have a minimum basic capital of 100,000 Sk.

Foundation officials readily agree that foundations, by definition, are "grant-seeking and grant-giving" organizations, meaning that money is a major component of their existence.

"Many foundations are not foundations because they have no money," said Milan Ukrop, the head of the legislative department at the Ministry of Justice that drew up the bill. "They're just groups of people representing a foundation but in reality they're not a foundation."

Another major sticking point is the retention of a requirement to have foundations register with the appropriate ministry that "relates to the highest degree to the foundation's purpose," or at the Ministry of the Interior. Once that approval has been given, a foundation then must register with the courts. To Demes, this "two step approval process" forces a foundation's application to be unnecessarily scrutinized and opens the door for politics to color decisions. His concerns are backed by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), a U.S.-based think tank that specializes in non-profit legislation. Invited by the Justice Ministry to comment on the bill, ICNL called ministry registration "inconsistent with democratic principles" and "one of the most restrictive registration procedures in the entire (central and eastern European) region."

Ukrop disagrees that decisions will be politicized. "If you accept this philosophy," he said, "nothing would function, not even elections." He added that all political parties, civic associations and foundations are currently registered at the Interior Ministry. "Nothing has changed because they are being registered there now."

Under the proposed law, the Interior Ministry would not only approve a foundation's registration but would also collect each foundation's annual report to ensure that funds are being spent according to the foundation's stated purpose. "If money is given for a liver transplant," Ukrop said, using a hypothetical example, "it must be shown that it was given for the transplant and not to buy a car."

But Demes said that foundations are already set up to internally watch themselves and don't need the Interior Ministry to do it for them. "This is the trouble. They think that the government is wiser than the citizens," the Gremium's head said. "The third sector is composed of numerous self-governing organizations. If a foundation is misusing funds, it will be killed off."

While there are fundamental disagreements with the draft, Ukrop said 36 Slovak and international foundations contributed comments on it, an assertion vehemently disputed by Demes. "If the Gremium was not involved in the comments, then they are lying (about the 36 foundations). Show us who they are." Whatever the case, at least the two largest American foundations with offices in Slovakia—the Foundation for a Civil Society and the Open Society Fund—were kept out of the comment loop, according to their respective directors, who told THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR that they were never contacted by the ministry to comment on the draft.

Meanwhile, a second proposal on non-profit organizations generally, which was drawn up at the same time as the bill on foundations, has raised hardly a stir, perhaps because the Gremium worked closely with Justice Ministry officials in its formulation.

Another mystery lies in who is behind the bill and what the motives are for it. Though no one has yet to step forward and claim responsibility, one HZDS MP's published opinions may give an insight into the government's view of foundations and their activities in the country.

They're not flattering. "These non-profit organizations create a picture of political chaos that is not sympathetic to Slovakia nor well-wishing to Slovaks," Roman Hofbauer, a HZDS deputy, wrote in an October 4 article in the government-supported daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. "And it's not just those clubs and organizations with minimal resources. On the contrary, the larger the organization, the more they are against Slovakia and the more seminars, symposia and congresses they have around the world that soils this state."

In a later article on December 28 in the same paper, Hofbauer pushes the envelope a little further, accusing foundations of disseminating "a brutal, cold-blooded and purposeful selection of information with the goal and intention of providing the world with only a one-sided and thus totally deformed picture of Slovakia and our civil, cultural and political scene."

Asked about Hofbauer's views, Demes used one word: "paranoid." And he is convinced that Hofbauer's thinking is not simply his own. "Hofbauer is not a one-man show," Demes said. "He's articulating the current government's philosophy. I take him seriously because what he says is what the government believes and that's the government's view of democracy."

Slovakia: SNS Proposes Law on Protection of Republic

96CH0035A Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 16 Jan 96 p 12

[Article by Daniel Borsky: "Ready to Rumble?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A proposal on the protection of the republic being pushed by the Slovak National Party (SNS) may appear on parliament's agenda as soon as January but no later than March next year, Bartolomej Kunc, a SNS MP told THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR.

But it's not when it could appear that have citizens and legal experts talking. It's concern over whether the measure would propel Slovaks back into a state of mind of having to watch what they say and who they're saying it to.

The SNS proposal first surfaced last April, when Kunc and eight other fellow party members drew it up. At that time, though, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the SNS's big brother in the coalition, wasn't listening.

But two months ago, HZDS chief Vladimir Meciar resurrected the idea before a screaming crowd at his party's monthly rally in Bratislava's Pasienky sport arena. "On my desk I have two versions of the law on protection of the republic—one softer and one tougher," the prime minister boasted. "So anyone who wants to do battle with the power of the state will have the chance."

Kunc explained the initiative's philosophy. "There is no extreme thing such as nationalism or chauvinism behind the proposal. It is a natural philosophy of defending the national interests of Slovakia," he said.

"Those interests can ill be defended in an atmosphere of permanent attacks from the domestic daily press and sending abroad signals that distort everything that exists here. When this is done, Slovakia is presented as a country that should be expelled from Europe rather than admitted to it. We cannot let these things continue to happen."

Kunc also said he envisioned the proposal to be tacked on as an amendment to paragraphs 92 and 108 of Slovakia's criminal code. The former paragraph deals with disruption of the state system and integrity, the latter with the deliberate spreading of misinformation about the state.

Ernest Valko, an attorney and the last chairman of Czechoslovakia's federal constitutional court, said that both amendments would throw the country back into the time before November 1989.

"If we compare paragraph 92 of the criminal act from before November 1989 with paragraph 92 as proposed by the SNS, we see that they are almost the same," Valko explained. "Only the word 'socialist' is left out, and the punishment varies from 1 to 5 years in prison as opposed to 8 to 12 years under the communist version. Take it or leave it, I'm deeply convinced that this amendment, if passed, represents a major setback."

Kunc argued that Slovakia needs the extra teeth because of its youth. He also said the SNS drew its inspiration from similar amendments to criminal legislation in France, Germany, Sweden and Austria. "Does anybody want to convince me that these countries are fascist, post-communist or in any other way undemocratic?" Kunc asked.

But Valko said that the SNS wants to put both amendments under the same disguise and that would clash with the Fundamental Charter of Human Rights. "All those countries have regulations more or less similar to the proposed paragraph 92," the lawyer admitted. "But in none of them can one find anything similar to paragraph 108."

Kunc, for his part, maintains paragraph 108 is logical because just as any individual can sue another individual in a case involving libel, the state should have that right too. "Nobody can convince me that only individuals can be disparaged," Kunc said. "A state is a legal entity too and if it is slandered, it should have the means to protect itself."

Many Slovaks remember how the old regime enforced the regulation on disparaging the state. Anybody who said something bad about communist leaders while having a beer in a *krcma* could have been sued.

Valko said paragraph 108 enables this practice to come back. "Just read the regulation," said Valko, quoting it, 'Anybody who on the territory of the Slovak Republic or outside it deliberately spreads misinformation...can be punished'. "This regulation goes exactly in that direction," he concluded.

But Kunc disagreed, saying that this practice was only possible under the socialist justice and police. "Of course a citizen can be accused based on this regulation, but the accuser will have to find witnesses and prove the misdeed. It will not be possible to bust somebody without a reason."

Slovakia: Poll Shows Support for HZDS Rising

AU2102134696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 19 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "r": "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Still Has the Largest Percentage of Supporters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Radio's Methodology and Research Department included in its February omnibus [omnibusovy] survey the traditional question about current preferences for political parties and movements. From 5 to 13 February 1996, a representative sample of 1,231 respondents above 18 answered the question: "If parliamentary elections were to be held this week, for which party or movement would you cast your vote?" The following ranking emerged from their replies (the figure in brackets expresses preferences from the January [1996] survey):

Party Preferences (in percent)

	Feb 96	Jan 96
1. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]	33.2	30.2
2. Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]	12.4	12.6
3. Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]	10.9	10.2
4. Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU]	9.4	8.2
5. Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH]	5.6	5.5
6. Democratic Party [DS]	4.7	6.1
7. Green Party in Slovakia [SZS]	4.3	4.1
8. Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]	4.2	5.2
9. Slovak National Party [SNS]	4.0	6.7
10. Coexistence	3.3	2.4

	Feb 96	Jan 96
11. Communist Party of Slovakia [KSS]	3.0	2.4
12. Hungarian Civic Party [MOS]	1.6	1.2
13. Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]	1.5	2.6
14. Other parties	2.0	2.5

The above survey of preferences is based on the replies of only those respondents who declared that they would take part in the elections and know for whom they would vote. This was the case of 64 percent of the sample under review.

Slovakia: Economy Needs Foreign Investment

96CH0039B Bratislava SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 30 Jan 96 pp 1, 10

[Article by Daniel Borsky: "Slovaks Debate If Economy Needs a Boost"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Slovakia can boast that it has the most bullish economy of all post-Communist countries in central and eastern Europe. In 1995, GDP growth rose to 6.6 percent, inflation was wrestled down to 7.5 percent, unemployment was squeezed under 13 percent and the budget deficit refused to exceed 2 percent of GDP. Even more, all of these glittering, economic marks for Europe's youngest country were achieved while Slovakia basked in a positive balance of both foreign trade and payments.

"If we take a look at these macro-economic figures," said Juraj Rencko, an analyst at the Slovak Academy of Science's forecasting department, "it is true that Slovakia's economy shows the best dynamism of all."

Still, while many economists here and abroad applaud the strength of the country's domestic engine, they wonder how much fuel is left in the tank. Not only is Slovakia trailing the other Visegard countries in foreign capital inflows, but it ranks dead last among all reforming central and eastern European countries. According to the German economic daily HANDELSBLAT, out of $23.7 billion that has been invested in the region since 1989, only $0.5 billion went to Slovakia, a paltry 2.1 percent sliver of the foreign capital pie.

In other words, Slovaks had to feed their country's growth by themselves, yet they've done it patiently, avoiding social unrest. Now it looks as if it's time for that growth to feed them back. For the first time since the 1989 revolution, real income rose. According to the Slovak Statistical Bureau, household income in the first 9 months of 1995 increased by 3.8 percent and retirement pensions by 1.4 percent in real terms.

And forecasts for 1996 look even better. "For 1996, a 5-percent growth in real income can be expected," Rencko said. In almost the same breath, though, Rencko added that it will take some time for Slovaks to recover the lost economic ground resulting from Slovakia's transformation from a socialist to a market economy. "Even with optimum development," he said, "it is unrealistic that Slovaks would reach 1989 income levels before the end of the decade."

Even though Slovaks have some catching up to do, the present situation, Rencko agreed, looks rosy. Perhaps that is what gives Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar the guts to repeatedly state that Slovakia is the best reforming country. But Rencko is quick to point out that the country is rapidly approaching an economic fork in the road. "Especially in a transformation period, one must judge also the quality of structural changes," he said. "Slovakia has to choose the right priorities. First of all, it means to increase the competitiveness of our companies and to support entrepreneurs, for an economy whose foreign trade turnover equals its GDP is a very open one. And a country with such an economy must build its long-term growth on increasing competitiveness."

This is where Slovakia teeters on major economic peril. Competitiveness is an alias for investments, and the Slovak economy is starving for capital. Since domestic capital sources are seriously malnourished, the only possibility seems to be foreign capital.

But the openings from the Meciar administration have been too narrow for it to flood in, Rencko said, citing a major example. "Foreign capital has been excluded from the privatization process," he said.

"The only way it can enter is through bank loans or portfolio capital, that is, through investments on the capital market. But unfortunately, this market in Slovakia is demolished, not transparent and most of all, untrustworthy. So the roads for foreign capital are impassable at the moment, which doesn't quite prove that we are eager to get it."

Rencko points to some actions by the Finance Ministry as scaring off foreign investors, in particular its abolishment of the Bratislava Options Exchange (BOB) and its crusade against the country's three biggest investment funds that was ultimately turned down by the Supreme Court.

"I must confess that I don't have a single clue about where the Finance Ministry wants to lead the country's capital market," Rencko said.

"I don't know whether the ministry realizes that what it's doing is blocking the prerequisites for long-term development. It's not a matter of hindering the development of three investment funds, it's a matter of making collective investing uncertain."

In the first half of 1995, foreign capital inflows virtually stopped, and although the situation slightly improved in the third quarter, foreign investment seems to remain the Achilles' heel of Slovakia's economy. But since Slovakia's is an economy in reform, it has Achilles' heels on both legs. The other heel is generally called a preservation of social peace.

Labor unions have made it clear that keeping the peace will require doling out some money. Some labor unions in the non-industrial sphere, such as teachers and health care employees, have asked for as much as a 30-percent salary raise.

In general, labor unionists are requesting a 10-14 percent increase, which after subtracting the predicted 8-percent inflation rate, would mean a 2-6 percent increase in real terms. "I think these demands should be acceptable," commented Rencko.

So, although their real income levels still hover more than 20 percent under the living standard in 1989, Slovaks are entering 1996 secure in the knowledge that they will harvest at least something for the first time since the economic transformation began. But it remains to be seen how many more bumper crops they will be able to produce by themselves.

Hungary: Court Rejects Workers' Party Motion on NATO

LD2002175796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitutional Court turned down a request to consider a claim that the National Assembly's refusal to call a referendum on accession to NATO was unconstitutional, saying that this went beyond the courts's authority. The court said that the National Assembly's resolution contained a decision, that is, it was not a legal provision or any other legal instrument of public administration. This means that the Constitutional Court cannot carry out a subsequent examination of its legality. The body is not authorized to oblige the National Assembly to call a referendum, and that is why the judges of the Constitutional Court rejected the motion of the Workers' Party.

Hungary: Opposition's 'Shift to the Right' Considered

AU1902132196 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Feb 96 p 3

[Editorial by Laszlo Zappe: "Clarification or Drifting to the Right?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Now we can keep making combinations. We can keep pondering and presuming, as well as predicting. It is possible that something will change radically in our political life. So far, the political struggle seems to have been confined to the fact that those in the government kept bickering, while the opposition parties were laughing their heads off. Jozsef Antall fought with Csurka and Torgyan in order to somehow keep his party and government in the center right. Assembled in the Democratic Charter, the opposition organized the civil society's disapproval and sent the signals saying that this is not the way they envisaged life in the new regime.

Then the country was filled with bickering between socialists and liberals, with [Independent Smallholders' Party Chairman Jozsef] Torgyan supporting this most ardently. Nobody could compete with Torgyan in this. Perhaps this is what led to the situation in which, now that the coalition parties seem to get used to each other, the storm is breaks out in the opposition. Not among various opposition parties, but within the opposition parties. If we take a close look at the recent developments, everything becomes clear. It seems that, after Lajos Fur's resignation, the Hungarian Democratic Forum was unable to avoid taking the struggle between the national-oriented and the liberals to a decision: At the beginning of March, the deputies will have to decide between Ivan Szabo and Sandor Lezsak and, no matter what the outcome of this competition will be, it seems that the attempts of the former prime minister to integrate the party are over. In the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], it is almost certain that the clash surrounding the election of the head of the parliamentary group is the beginning of a tearing test. If we add to all this that Torgyan welcomes Lajos Fur's departure obviously because he hopes for the MDF's drift to the right, and that the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] welcomes the reelection of Tamas Isepy as head of the KDNP's parliamentary faction, we can even think that some kind of clarification will start in the right wing and that ideas, interests, and efforts that somehow appeared together in the heat of the change in the regime will finally separate: Conservative liberalism will separate from national radicalism.

However, we can also regard all these recent movements from the viewpoint that the need for ideological clarification did not emerge in the parties accidentally. The success of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], their popularity according to the opinion poll led to the internal struggles. It is possible that the party leaders like Lezsak and Giczy are right, namely, that the members are becoming radical. At most, they are wrong in assuming that they can compete with Togyan in demagogy. In this case, however, what we see now are the signs of a shift to the right, a right-wing radicalization of considerable strata of the society, rather than a simple clarification. We can fear, therefore, that the traditional center-right will essentially disappear; in other words, it becomes clear that it was a harmless intellectual illusion to create strong, West European-type Christian conservative bourgeois parties under the current economic and spiritual conditions. And this makes both the leftist and liberal parties and their supporters, as well as the entire Hungarian society, face totally different questions; as if we can count on a strong center right and bourgeois conservatism.

If this is so—and the coming weeks and months will tell, we will have to take seriously something that is almost impossible to take seriously with a sober mind, namely, Torgyan.

Hungary: FKGP Begins Preparations for Elections

LD1702210996 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 17 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The national presidium of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] will give help to the Christian-national wings of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] to prevent liberal forces within the parties from getting the upper hand. Beginning Monday, 19 February, the FKGP will begin preparations for the elections. Therefore, the presidium has set up an election office headed by Party Chairman Jozsef Torgyan.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] The journalists learned that the party presidium thoroughly discussed the KDNP's executive session to be held in advance of its due date, since they are concerned that the Christian Democrats will fall into the liberals' trap. That is the reason why they support Gyorgy Giczy, who represents the national wing of the KDNP.

Torgyan announced that they will hold a large-scale farewell rally for the government in March.

[Begin Torgyan recording] We should try and bring about a situation on 14 March, the eve of our national day, whereby we force the government to quit. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Jozsef Torgyan said early elections are unavoidable in Hungary. That is the reason why they set up an election office to be headed by the party chairman. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Minority Language Use in Local Government

96CH0030C Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 9 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Mr. Ferko's Mistake; or What the Law Does Not Explicitly Prohibit Is Permissible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Ferko, the director of the State Language Main Department at the Slovak Ministry of Culture, declared last week that the meetings of aldermen must be conducted in Slovak since the Language Law came into force. To find out what those who are directly affected think of this statement, we contacted Tamas Novak, a lawyer and deputy mayor of Komarom [Komarno].

"Mr. Ferko was probably in error when he spoke of the aldermen's meetings, because those meetings are closed, and attendance is by invitation only. Actually the aldermen are the mayor's advisory panel, and their deliberations are not open to the public. We usually debate the matters that will be submitted to the municipal council. Officials of the Ministry of Culture may not attend the aldermen's closed meetings in order to exercise control. Only a law, but not a ministerial decree, may interfere in the rights of local governments.

"According to the pertinent statutory regulations, local residents may attend the meetings of the municipal council and have the right to speak there, to make complaints, and even to introduce proposals. Bilingual meetings of the municipal council have been the practice in our city up to now. Of the 29 council members, four are Slovaks. When they addressed the municipal council in Slovak, we usually replied to them in Slovak. The next meeting of the municipal council will be held at the end of this month. And the meetings will probably continue to be conducted as before, in Hungarian and Slovak."

According to Laszlo Stubendek, Komarom's other deputy mayor, the fact that the language used in the deliberations of the municipal council is chosen as needed, does not violate the Language Law that came into force as of 1 January. "Although the law does state that meetings of local-government bodies have to be conducted in the state language, it does not say that the state language must be used exclusively. And whatever the law does not explicitly prohibit is permissible. To be more specific, the point is that the law does not say that the meetings may be conducted also in a minority language. This is a legal gap; and until the Constitutional Court renders its opinion on this issue, we will continue to abide by what the Slovak Constitution says. For the time being, the meetings of the municipal council will continue to be conducted as before, in whichever language needed. And what does it matter if a member of the municipal council happens to speak in Hungarian?"

Hungary: Improvement in 1995 Export Figures Detailed

AU2102091196 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 Feb 96 p 13

[Unattributed report: "Hungarian Exports Increasing—Signs of Short-Term Adjustment in Foreign Trade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In 1995, Hungary sold one-third more materials, spare parts, and food industry products abroad than in 1994. The purchase of materials and spare parts increased most in our imports too: three times the average imports. All this transpires from a recent analysis of the Industry and Trade Ministry.

In 1995, the growth in Hungarian exports exceeded the growth in imports by 14.5 percent: Our imports only increased by 7 percent, compared with the 21.5 percent increase in our exports. This led to the fact that the net foreign trade turnover balance showed a deficit of $1.8 billion; this figure was better than the one recorded in 1994 by $1.2 billion.

The structure of Hungarian foreign trade also showed an interesting development: Regarding our exports, we registered the biggest growth in the selling of materials, spare parts, and agricultural products, by about one-third. If we examine our 1995 exports according to main groups of goods, we can see that materials and spare parts made up 40 percent of our overall exports, consumer goods made up 25 percent, agricultural and food industry products 22 percent, machines and installations 11 percent, and energy 2 percent.

The exports of materials and spare parts increased at a higher pace than average, namely, by 30 percent. This sector provided 52 percent of the overall export surplus and the increase stood at almost $1.2 billion. The export of light metal products, semifinished chemical products, and vehicle spare parts contributed most to this growth. Our agriculture and food industry had similar successes in 1995: They increased exports by 28 percent, two-thirds of this increase was due to the export of vegetable products. In addition, we exported more pork and poultry last year.

The export of consumer goods in 1995 exceeded the relevant exports of 1994 by 12 percent: The export of cars, furniture, household electric appliances, and underwear showed the biggest growth.

Exports of machines and installations increased at a similar pace, namely, by 13 percent: Exports of industrial electric appliances and switches contributed most to the aforementioned growth.

According to the Industry Ministry evaluation, the product structure of Hungarian exports in 1995 showed signs of short-term adjustment: Marketing drifted toward exports because of the drop in the domestic consumer market and changes in the exchange rate. At the same time, there was an increase in the weight of lower-level and price-sensitive products in our exports, and this cannot be regarded as a favorable phenomenon.

The raw materials arriving for commission work made up 55 percent of the 7 percent increase in imports, or $1.171 billion.

B-H: Bosnian Serbs Reestablish International Cooperation

LD2102215196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2125 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 21 Feb (SRNA) — The leadership of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, the People's Assembly, the government, and the supreme command of the armed forces this evening announced that they are reestablishing full cooperation with representatives of the international community, in accordance with the Dayton agreement and the results of the Rome summit.

"The state bodies of the Serb Republic once again voice their protest because of unequal status [as received] and unprincipled conduct on the part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Implementation Force, especially with regard to the kidnapping of senior Serb officers, whose immediate release is requested," it is said in a statement submitted to SRNA.

The state bodies of the Serb Republic warn that "the aim and interest of the Serb Republic is that the Serbs should remain in Serb Sarajevo, but that every form of help be given to all those who decide to move out."

"Responsibility for the exodus of the Serbs from Sarajevo lies with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, because of pressure it put on the international community in order to take over the control of Serb Sarajevo as quickly as possible. In this way the international community was deceived with regard to the feeling of security among the Serbs in Sarajevo," the statement concludes.

B-H: Mediators Seek Meetings After Serbs Lift Boycott

AU2202125296 Paris AFP in English 1117 GMT 22 Feb 96

[By Jacques Charmelot]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 22 (AFP) — Bosnia's peace process headed back on track Thursday as Bosnian Serbs announced they would resume military links with the NATO-led force after a crisis which threatened to derail the Dayton accord.

Mediators immediately tried to arrange a meeting of Serb and Implementation Force (IFOR) officials after the two-week suspension — imposed to protest the arrest of two Serb officers on suspicion of war crimes — was lifted.

"We're seeing signs of a thaw," an IFOR official said, while another said a meeting was due later on Thursday between representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and the international community.

"That will be the test," the second official said, under cover of anonymity. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serb civilian authorities had suspended contacts with the Bosnian government on February 6 after Bosnian police arrested General Djordje Djukic and his deputy Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic in Sarajevo.

The "government" of the Serb political entity nevertheless continued working with IFOR whereas the military hierarchy broke off contacts on February 8 under the orders of its commander General Ratko Mladic. [passage omitted]

Wednesday's communique also noted that it was "in the interest of the SR" that Serbs should stay in Serb areas of Sarajevo due to be handed over to the government.

But it said "as much help as possible should be provided to those who choose to leave."

Meanwhile overall IFOR commander US Admiral Leighton Smith was due to visit the Serb quarter of Vogosca north of Sarajevo, which will Friday be placed in the control of police from the Moslem-Croat federation police.

However many of its Serb residents have fled ahead of the deadline, and the situation is similar in four other Serb districts to be transferred to Bosnian government authority by March 20.

Around 20,000 of their 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants have fled so far to be rehoused in Serb-held villages in eastern Bosnia.

B-H: Police Detain 9 Suspected Iranian 'Terrorists'

LD2002184096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Islamic terrorists, mujahidin, who should have already left Bosnia-Herzegovina in compliance with the Dayton agreement, are still where they were. A group of them was detained in Jajce. Zvonimir Cilic has a report:

[Cilic] Jajce civilian police detained nine Iranian citizens in the course of a routine check up at the Zelenkovac checkpoint on Saturday 17 February. Seven were travelling by bus from Tesanj to Bihac, and two other travelled in a four-wheel drive immediately behind the bus, we learned today from the Vitez operational area [of the Croatian Defense Council — HVO].

This is a group, according to documents found on them, that arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina 15 days ago; it is

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This is a group, according to documents found on them, that arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina 15 days ago; it is made up of three professors of Islamic philosophy, two tradesmen, one music student, one civil engineering student, one physician, and one calligraphy expert. This group was not armed, but their visit was not announced by the Musilm side or by anyone else.

There is a well-founded suspicion regarding their statement that they have come to Bosnia-Herzegovina to organize humanitarian shows and music concerts, because, in addition to a certain quantity of propaganda meterial found on them, all of them had state-of-the-art technical equipment which is generally used for intelligence purposes.

On the basis of details obtained so far, the operational area of Vitez is of the opinion that they are a multi-disciplinary group whose objective is to implant principles of the Iranian Islamic revolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The group's visit has been linked with the anniversary of Khomeyni's revolution, for which the central celebration for Bosnia-Herzegovina has been held in Bihac under the sponsorship of 5th Corps Commander Genersl Atif Dudakovic, according to what the operational area of Vitez has learned.

We do not want to prejudge anything when it comes to this group of Iranians; I immediately informed HVO bodies and the Implementation Force [IFOR] headquarters about the whole thing. I expect IFOR officers to come to Jajce today or tomorrow at the latest to take over this group of Iranian citizens, Brigadier Drago Dragicevic, the commander of Vitez operational area, said today.

B-H: Arrested Iranians To Be Handed Over to IFOR

AU2102152296 Paris AFP in English
1446 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb , Feb 21 (AFP) — Nine Iranians arrested in Bosnia-Herzegovina and accused of being mujahedeen freedom fighters will shortly be handed over to peacekeeping forces, Iranian diplomats here said Wednesday.

Mohamed Javad Hemet Panah, second secretary at Iran's embassy in Croatia, said Bosnian Croats who made the arrests Saturday "realise there was a mistake and that these people are not mujahedeen."

"We understand they will soon be released and handed to IFOR," the NATO-led peace Implementation Force in the former Yugoslav republic, he added.

He said the men were in fact part of a popular entertainment group who were touring Moslem countries until they were arrested in Jajce, western Bosnia.

A Croat police officer in Jajce admitted the men were not Islamic guerrillas but insisted "we don't believe they came to Bosnia to organise concerts because they had a large quantity of propaganda material."

Under the US-brokered Dayton peace accord, foreign fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina were to leave the country, including the several thousand mujahedeen fighting with the mostly Moslem Bosnian government.

Bosnian Croat radio monitored by the BBC in London had reported late Tuesday that Bosnian Croat police were holding the nine Iranians suspected of entering Bosnia to spread Islamic revolutionary propaganda.

The radio said the nine men were travelling from Tesanj to Bihac in western Bosnia.

According to their documents, the Iranians arrived in Bosnia two weeks ago. They told police they were in Bosnia to organise concerts and entertainments for humanitarian purposes.

But Croat police charged that they found on them "state-of-the-art technical equipment which is generally used for intelligence purposes," the radio said.

The official Iranian news agency IRNA earlier reported that three Iranians who were briefly detained by NATO forces in Bosnia last week returned to Iran on Wednesday.

Mohammad Pour-Salem, Asghar Ali-Shahi and Ali Jafarzadeh arrived in Tehran, accompanied by the Iranian ambassador in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mohammad-Ebrahim Taherian, it said.

In a statement to reporters after their arrival, the three described their arrest as a "premeditated plan" by NATO to "launch a wave of propaganda against Iran and Bosnian Moslems."

The three, including one diplomat, were among 11 arrested during a raid on Thursday in a compound west of Sarajevo. They were handed over to Bosnian authorities two days later and then deported.

They had been suspected of training fighters to launch operations against NATO facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Tehran has denied its citizens were involved in any military activities.

Ambassador Talerian for his part accused the NATO forces of "mistreating" the Iranians during their two days of captivity, saying they had been the "victims of inhumane and offensive treatment."

The Bosnian government has said the camp where the three were arrested was a center for anti-terrorist training of police and security forces, not a terrorist safe house.

B-H: Iranian Embassy Protests Abduction of Nine Iranians

AU2102152496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement issued by the Iranian Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina reads as follows:

On 18 February this year, one Bosnian and nine Iranian citizens, members of an Iranian group that arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina 15 days ago for the month of Ramadan, on their way home, passing through the Jajce Municipality, were separated from other passengers in a bus with the registration number DO 0757 BH. It is assumed that they are being held by an extremist group of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], which wants to violate the laws of the Federation, the Iranian Embassy statement reads.

B-H: 'New Islamic Terrorist Camp' Said Neutralized

BR2202092896 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Feb 96 p 8

[Report by Andrea Bonanni: "Emissaries From Iran To Train Terrorists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels — A new Islamic terrorist camp has been allegedly discovered and neutralized by NATO troops deployed in Bosnia. On 15 February IFOR troops broke into an Iranian-run mojahedin training center some 20 km from Sarajevo.

The report of this new discovery, originating from Western sources, was not officially confirmed by NATO headquarters. Nevertheless very senior NATO officials did admit yesterday that the Islamic terrorist threat is becoming one of the main concerns for allied troops in the former Yugoslavia and that Western intelligence is convinced of the existence of other mojahedin training centers in Bosnia.

Few details have emerged regarding the possible discovery of the new terrorist camp. Like the other one, it is apparently in the area around Sarajevo and again employs Iranian instructors together with Bosnian guerrillas.

Before the Dayton accords, at the height of the war in Bosnia, the Islamic fundamentalists sent the Muslim government of Sarajevo reinforcements in the form of manpower, materiel, and instructors to organize fighting units of mojahedin. Tehran played a major role at that time. But the Americans made their military assistance promised to Sarajevo dependent on the complete withdrawal of foreign guerrillas. This operation is proving more difficult than expected.

According to Western sources, the official withdrawal of a number of Islamic "military advisers" is being accompanied by the arrival of new men connected to fundamentalist terrorist groups. And this time the target of the attacks would be not the Bosnian Serb militias but, rather, NATO forces. The materiel seized at the Fojnica training center included models of Western installations.

Apart from these fears, Brussels forms a very optimistic assessment of the progress of the NATO operation in Bosnia. IFOR's 60,000 men have now all reached their operational destinations. The separating line between the two alignments, which is 4 km wide and over 1,000 km long, is now in force, and the last part of it — the most difficult one, which passes around Sarajevo — is now being completed.

Those in charge of the operation say that they are confident: They are supposed to prevent the spring offensive that has always marked the resumption of hostilities. Even cooperation between Russians and Americans is proceeding well. This, especially since Moscow recalled and replaced General Stetskov, the field commander of the Russian units, who was considered uncooperative and who was guilty of having met publicly with the commander of the Bosnian Serb militias, Mladic, who is wanted as a war criminal.

B-H: Greek, U.S. Intelligence Sources on Muslim Threat

LD2102180596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1712 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Athens, Feb. 21 (TANJUG) — Bosnian Muslims could attack Greek troops within the international Implementation Force (IFOR) and make it look as if it had been carried out by the Serbs, the TV station Antena said on Tuesday evening quoting a confidential report by the Greek Intelligence Service (EIP).

Such actions aim to provoke an IFOR intervention against the Serbs, the EIP report said.

Antena claims that the Greek Intelligence Service's assessments that the Muslims are the greatest threat to IFOR coincide with the analyses of the U.S. defense ministry's intelligence service.

Both the Greek and the U.S. intelligence services have confirmed that groups of Bosnian Muslims had prepared to carry out terrorist attacks.

In support of this IFOR last week uncovered near the town of Fojnica, some 50 km away from Sarajevo, a camp for training terrorists which contained three Iranian and eight Bosnian muslim instructors.

B-H: Serbs Condemn IFOR Entry Into Barracks

LD1902004096 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 18 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] IFOR's [Implementation Force's] entry to the Serb Republic Army barracks near Han Pijesak yesterday is yet more proof of how the Dayton agreement is being interpreted arbitrarily.

American soldiers, supported by aircraft and helicopters have alarmed the population of Han Pijesak, who were at that very moment at the local cemetery, paying respects on the Day of the Dead at the graves of their relatives, some of whom were killed in last summer's NATO air raids.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Snjezan Lalovic] American soldiers from the multinational division based at Vlasenica showed their knowledge of the Dayton agreement and customs of Serb people yesterday. On the Day of the Dead, when several hundred Han Pijesak residents were at the local cemetery, paying respects to the graves, among which are buried the ones killed in last summer's orgy of the NATO alliance in the Serb Republic, American soldiers have, with constant overflights of the aircraft and helicopters, and with armored cars stationed around them, entered the barracks of the Serb Republic Army to count arms transferred from the front lines.

All this took place within the zone which is outside the 10 kilometers of the — in American vocabulary — lines of confrontation.

Mr. Batist, what is your mission today?

[IFOR Col. John Batist, identified by caption] Our mission is to monitor and to implement the Dayton peace accord. We are going throughout Serb Republic and the Muslim Croat Federation and we are looking at arms set aside from the front lines. We are doing this in the zones of separation and no arms should be in the 10 kilometer zone from the confrontation lines.

[Lalovic] Is this line more or less than 10 kilometers?

[Batist] Yes, this is more than 10 kilometers. But we have freedom of movement and that is what we are doing today.

[Lalovic] Have you found anything that is not correct?

[Batist] No, everything is correct. We cooperate well with the members of the Bosnian Serb Army.

[Lalovic] Today is the Day of the Dead. Do you know that? Your airplanes are frightening local residents.

[Batist] No, we are not frightening them. We do not want to frighten anybody. [end recording]

IFOR has violated parts of the Dayton agreement at the expense of the Serb side. The agreement on strengthening security and cooperation measures has also been violated. Namely, according to the agreement on regional stabilization which is an integral part of the military section of the Dayton agreement, the NATO forces that entered the Serb barracks are not authorized to count and inspect either the Serb army or the other side.

According to the agreement signed on 26 January 1996, such actions have been left to the jurisdiction of the entities and OSCE. The military experts at the general staff said that yesterday's activities of the American multinational division in the garrison in Han Pijesak had been carried out with the sole aim of provoking an incident and provoking the Serb army at the time of the tripartite meeting between Serb, Croat, and Muslim delegation with the members of the contact group in Rome. The question of lifting of sanctions against the Serb Republic, something that according to the Dayton agreement should have been done after the separation of forces and the follow up report to the IFOR command that that activity had been completed, was to be discussed at the meeting among other issues.

The American officers' and soldiers' tour of the Serb Republic Army barracks has another reason. They were given the task of establishing what kind of technical equipment the Serb army has at its disposal so they could equip the Federation Army with the same amount but more sophisticated technical equipment.

All this is contrary to the Dayton agreement because it is in contravention of Annex 1B, Articles 2 and 4 of the military section according to which, as we have already said, IFOR does not inspect or log armaments.

The action by the American soldiers yesterday deserves even more attention in light of the fact that the Muslim and Croat commanders, Rasim Delic and Ante Budimir, are at the moment in the United States. They are on a secret visit at the invitation of the American defense secretary, William Perry, and are part of the delegation of the Republic of Croatia.

Their task is to secure more weapons for their soldiers without having to pay for them. This will be repaid to the Americans with the leasing to NATO of bases on their territory. According to information, Delic and Budimir will stay in the United States until 19 February, when a meeting is planned with NATO commanders aboard one of the ships anchored in the Adriatic Sea.

B-H: Ukrainian UNPROFOR Unit's Status 'Illegal'

AU1602205196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 16 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian battalion, which is illegally present in Sarajevo as part of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], will either depart from Bosnia-Herzegovina soon or finally be incorporated into the Implementation Force [IFOR]. This was stated today to B-H PRESS by (?Amir Hadziomeragic), chairman by the state committee for cooperation with IFOR.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities have sent an official demand to Kofi Annan, UN undersecretary for peace missions, to have this issue solved immediately. The Ukrainian troops are still in Bosnia-Herzegovina as members of UNPROFOR, which is illegal considering the fact that the implementation mission has been taken over by IFOR. They are currently stationed in the Marshall Tito Barracks in Sarajevo without any assignment.

The Ukrainian Government has to sign an agreement with NATO representatives if it wants its troops to be incorporated into IFOR's structure. This has not yet been done, so it is high time the Ukrainians left Bosnia-Herzegovina or placed themselves under IFOR command.

B-H: Bosnian Serb Government Supports Exodus Decision

LD1702100896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0822 GMT 17 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Feb (SRNA) — The [Bosnian] Serb Republic Government adopted several measures and decisions at an extraordinary session last night and endorsed the decision of the Serb Sarajevo Assembly, undertaking to assist in the reception and accommodation of those residents who want to leave the Serb parts of the city before it becomes part of the [Muslim-Croat] Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This decision was reached because of the lack of understanding from the international community with regard to the status of Serb Sarajevo and the failure to give the Serb people their collective rights and security of person and property.

The government looked at specific proposals for the best possible ways of receiving and accommodating the residents of Serb Sarajevo and to this end formed an operational headquarters for the reception and accommodation of residents of Serb Sarajevo, with Gojko Klickovic appointed as its head.

The government will provide for the reception and accommodation of all residents of Serb Sarajevo who request it, and will ask the international community to ensure their unhindered departure from the city by 19 March, or by the transitional period of the transfer of authority to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ministers agreed that priority for accommodation should be given to families of war victims and invalids, and the removal of the remains of war victims should also be arranged in an organized manner as a matter of priority.

B-H: 'Almost All' Serbs Will Leave Sarajevo Suburbs

AU2202114996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Our assessment is that almost all the Serbs will leave Vogosca in line with the order they received from Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic said, responding to correspondents' questions after talks with Swedish Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm Wallen.

My personal opinion is that all of us should do more and give greater guarantees so that all the people residing in the Sarajevo suburbs will remain. If we suffer defeat here, it will have very negative consequences for the entire peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prlic said.

If this exodus continues, it will be the failure of both the peace process and the Bosnia-Herzegovina society, and the entire international community, Minister Wallen said, adding that the Serbs must be given assurances that they will be safe in their suburbs.

B-H: Serbs Express Fear of Federation Authority

AU2102191596 Paris AFP in English 1848 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 21 (AFP) — Bosnian Serbs in the Sarajevo suburb of Vogosca, anxious over the imminent arrival of Bosnian Government police forces, made a quick exit Wednesday [21 February] or weighed their options to stay. At the UN police station in Vogosca, a Serb-held suburb to the north of the Bosnian capital, a Serb refugee woman came Wednesday to seek reassurance over Friday's planned introduction of 85 Moslem police into the area. As members of the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) tramped in and out from the snow, the woman fired questions at the IPTF deputy station commander, Sergeant Patrick Leahy.

"How long can I stay here? Is it allowed for the people (from the city) to come to my apartment or knock on our doors?" she asked the Irish police officer.

"No, no, that's not going to happen. If she feels at all unsafe she can come here every day," Leahy replied to the young woman through a translator.

"But I can't," the woman said. "I have a small baby. I am not afraid of the police. I am just afraid that they (Moslem civilians) might come and tell me to get out."

A refugee from Visoko, a town not far from Sarajevo that is Bosnian Government hands, the woman later said that despite the assurances from Leahy, she would not be staying behind.

"We have nowhere to go, but I only plan to stay as long as the police are here. Ever since my husband was killed by a sniper in the war, I have decided not to live with Moslems ever again," she explained. [passage omitted]

"I'm leaving Vogosca and my own apartment where I've lived for 15 years," said Dokija Terzic, a middle-aged woman helping her husband to load their belongings into the back of a dirty truck parked outside a block of flats.

Fear of reprisals is the reason most of those leaving cite for fleeing homes they have, in many cases, lived in for years. The Serb suburbs were key to the rebel Serb army's siege of Sarajevo and most of the men were at one time in the military.

"I don't want to live in the (Moslem-Croat) Federation because we fought so much," Terzic said.

"In Vogosca, when everybody leaves, they (Moslems) will come into our homes and beat us. We will have to say what the Serbs did during the war," she said. "Nobody will stay. Nobody, nobody wants to stay."

B-H: Presidency Urges Serbs To Remain in Sarajevo

AU2102205696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Shortly before the evening newscast we received the following report:

The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today held a session presided over by President Alija Izetbegovic. The session was also attended by Miro Lazovic, chairman of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Presidency issued decrees validating several laws that were passed by the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at its last session. Among these is the Law on Amnesty.

The Presidency discussed a report on the current situation in the part of Sarajevo that should come under the control of the legal authorities. The Presidency again appeals to the Serb people not to fall for the propaganda of the Pale regime, which wants to push the Serbs into ethnic ghettos, to move them out of their homes and centuries-old houses. Do not believe in these false promises. You must know that according to the Dayton agreement, everyone will have to return to his home. Do not find yourself in the situation of having to be moved out of someone else's house and property that are being generously offered to you. Remain masters in your own houses.

All those who stay in Sarajevo are safe and the authorities of the state and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina guarantee their integrity and freedom, and the safety of their personal and other property. Serbs from Sarajevo, a law on amnesty has been passed. According to the law, all honest citizens are safe and equal. Do not leave your homes. Those who want to hide and justify their crimes are forcing you to do that. You also have all the guarantees of the international community. Stay in undivided Sarajevo so that we can build our future together.

The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina appeals to the international community to prevent forced emigration of people, plundering, and the spreading of fear among those who want to stay in their homes.

The Presidency drafted a program of activities of the state authorities at home and in our diplomatic offices abroad for the state holiday and Independence Day of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 1 March.

The Presidency also discussed other matters within its jurisdiction.

B-H: Officers' Arrest, Mostar Troubles Hampering Peace

LD1802175796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1641 GMT 18 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 18 (TANJUG) — The arrest of two Bosnian Serb officers by the Muslims and their extradition to the Hague war crimes tribunal, and events in divided Mostar, are hamperig the implementation of the Dayton peace accord, a Bosnian Serb party official insists.

The official, Dragutin Ilic, who heads the Socialist Party of the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska, was speaking in a TANJUG's guest panel discussion.

Ilic said that relations inside the Muslim-Croat Federation — set up by Bosnia's Muslims and Croats in March of 1994 under Washington's auspices after a year of bitter fighting for territories — were constantly on the brink of conflict.

The city of Mostar in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina has been split down the middle by the Muslims and Croats, after they have driven away the Serbs.

The Muslim government in Sarajevo, too, is hypocritical and its conduct is not conducive to confidence-building, Ilic said.

The Jan. 30 abduction of two officers of the Republika Srpska's army by Muslim police in the zone of responsibility of international peacekeepers in the Sarajevo area has created a feeling of insecurity among the Serbs, he said.

He added that all able-bodied Bosnian Serb men below the age of 65 had been in the Republika Srpska army and that now, in the reasoning of the Muslim government, any one of them could be arrested and charged with war crimes.

Ilic said that the conduct, too, of the Hague tribunal — set up in 1993 to investigate war crimes in former Yugoslavia — was not conducive to the building of trust among the Bosnian peoples.

The tribunal's prosecutor Richard Goldstone issued a warrant for the arrest of the two Serb officers six days after they had been abducted and held in a Muslim prison, and based his warrant only on information received from the Muslim side, Ilic added.

He said that the NATO-led international peace Implementation Force (IFOR) had come to Bosnia strongly prejudiced against the Serbs, but after their first contacts had been pleasantly surprised by the Serbs' cooperation, and now mutual trust was growing.

The social, economic and humanitarian situation in the Republika Srpska is difficult and complex, Ilic said.

Because of international sanctions, barely 10 or 20 percent of industrial capacities are in use, which means that the sanctions must be lifted if goods and capital are to flow again, he said.

B-H: Possible Changes to Koschnick's Mostar Plan Noted

LD2102152896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1410 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Feb. 21 (TANJUG) — Sources in the European Commission on Wednesday announced the possibility of giving up European administrator in Mostar Hans Koschnick's plan for the future administrative division of the Bosnian city and a possible search for a new formula.

There are still no signs what the new formula may look like but the European Union [EU] foreign ministers are expected to have their say on the matter at a meeting in Brussels on Monday.

The indications came after the latest developments in Mostar and constant provocations by Muslims and Croats that reduce the chances for implementing Koschnick's plan for the city's unification, sources in Brussels said after the Rome summit over the weekend.

In Mostar, which is divided into the Muslim and Croat sections, a decision on free movement of population came into force on Tuesday afternoon but an incident, provoked by Croats, spoiled the joy barely half an hour later when Croat nationalists attacked three Muslim youths who had crossed into the Croat part of Mostar in a car.

Early in February, Koschnick announced his plan for Mostar's administrative organization that provided for the city to be divided into three Croat and three Muslim communes, and a joint district in central Mostar where Muslims and Croats would share power.

Koschnick's plan for Mostar's territorial organization has not undergone fundamental changes but the central district has been considerably reduced in size to the benefit of the Croat side.

After the forming of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia in March 1994, Mostar remained a city divided into the eastern, Muslim- controlled part and the western, Croat-controlled part. It was also placed under a one-year E.U. administration.

At the beginning of the Bosnian civil war, Muslims and Croats in the Neretva river valley had expelled from the region about 45,000 local Serbs, but Koschnick's plan declines to even mention this fact.

European Union's concern was further raised by the recent hasty arrests of two senior officers of the Bosnian Serb army while they were heading for negotiations with Implementation Force (IFOR) officials in Sarajevo on Jan. 30, which resulted in more fear among local Serbs.

Commentator of the major Belgian daily LA LIBRE BELGIQUE Michel Rosten made a conclusion in the editorial on Wednesday that the international arbiters in the Bosnian conflict were biased against the Serbs.

The conclusion came after the announcement of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague to start legal proceedings against Serb Krajina leader Milan Martic, while at the same time ignoring massive war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers during and after Croatia's military offensive on Krajina, and after it became clear that the grounds for keeping the two Bosnian Serb officers imprisoned in The Hague were rather slim.

B-H: Joint Police Force Patrols Mostar 21 Feb

LD2102162896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1503 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 21 (TANJUG) — Joint police units were patrolling the streets of the divided Herzegovina city of Mostar on Wednesday, international police spokesman in Mostar Howard Fox said.

Foreign news agencies quoted him as specifying that the patrols are made up of policemen from the Muslim and Croat sections of the city, Sarajevo, Croatia and officers of the European Union police force.

Croat police at the main checkpoint between the east and west parts of Mostar were no longer stopping Muslim men wanting to cross into the Croat sector, Fox said.

The barrier at the checkpoint on the Croat side of the demarcation line has now been removed, but only women, children and the elderly are allowed to cross from one to the other part of the city.

The checkpoints were supposed to be removed at noon on Tuesday but Croat police armed with rifles stopped many Muslims from crossing on the grounds they were not carrying correct ID cards.

The city was quiet on Tuesday night, Fox said.

In Mostar, which is divided into the Muslim and Croat sections, a decision on free movement of population came into force at noon on Tuesday but barely half an hour later Croat nationalists provoked an incident.

Croat nationalists attacked three Muslim youths who had crossed into the Croat part of Mostar in a car.

In an incident which included shooting, one Muslim had been beaten before he managed to run away.

B-H: Joint Police Patrol Only Central Mostar 21 Feb

AU2102173096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the latest information, the first day of free movement in Mostar yesterday was marked by the arrest of nine citizens from the eastern part of Mostar in the western part of Mostar. Mirsad Behran reports from Mostar:

[Behran] The West European police could not confirm this morning whether nine people from eastern Mostar were arrested in western Mostar yesterday. According to Howard Fox, spokesman of the West European police in the town, four people had been arrested but were released in the afternoon.

Regarding the day of killed fighters, on the second day of Ramadan Bayram, this morning more than a 1,000 citizens from the east part of the town, led by Mayor Safet Orucevic and Herzegovina Mufti Hadzi Seid Efendija Smajkic, visited a building in the western part of the town where the fighters killed during the Serb-Montenegrin aggression on the town were buried.

This was a kind of protest by the citizens who are dissatisfied with the results achieved so far in the process of establishing freedom of movement in the town. Mayor Orucevic has appealed to the citizens for support in establishing the joint police in the town, as there will be no freedom of movement and reconstruction of destroyed Mostar without the joint police force.

According to the latest information, the citizens are crossing from one part to the other, but the barricades in the streets in the western part of Mostar are still there. The joint patrols are performing their job only in the narrow central zone of Mostar, contrary to what has been envisaged by Rome — that is, patrolling throughout the town as of 1200 on 20 February.

B-H: Izetbegovic Terms Mostar Situation 'Uncertain'

LD2102170296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1623 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 21 (TANJUG) - Situation in Mostar is uncertain because of "great resistance on the Croat side," Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic said Wednesday.

On the other hand, Croat Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak stated Wednesday that "all barriers on the Croat side were removed" and freedom of movement was made possible in the divided southern Bosnian city of Mostar.

In mostar, the decision on free circulation of people between the city's Croat and Muslim sections took effect at noon on Tuesday.

But only half an hour after this decision, agreed on at the Rome summit on Bosnia, became effective, Croat nationalists prevented a group of Muslims from crossing into their sector of the city.

In his statement to the Muslim Radio Sarajevo, Izetbegovic threatened that, if the Croat side failed to open the city, he would leave for "Europe, America and Islamic countries to tell them what has taken place."

He stressed that "in that case, Croatia would bear consequences for the disrespect of obligations it had taken on and for the undermining of the peace process."

Jarnjak, however, presented to the Croatian radio an entirely opposite assessment of the situation in Mostar. After his separate talks with representatives of the governments of Bosnian Croats and the Muslim-Croat Federation, he added that agreement was reached about joint actions of Croat, Muslim and west European policemen in Mostar.

Sources of the European Commission announced on Wednesday the possibility of giving up European administrator Hans Koschnick"s plan on the division of Mostar and turning to a search for a new formula.

There have been no hints as yet about the nature of the formula while waiting for results of a meeting of the European Union foreign ministers called in Brussels on Monday, February 26.

Koschnick's proposal from early February provided for the division of Mostar into three Muslim and three Croat districts and one joint district in which powers would be shared by Muslims and Croats. The proposal had not been altered much in Rome, except for the central zone which was markedly reduced.

B-H: Kapetanovic Says Serb 'Police' Terrorizing People

AU1602163696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Izudin Kapetanovic, prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Zlatko Vukmirovic and Eldin Karic; place and date not given: "With Little Steps to Results"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [VECERNJE NOVINE] Mr. Kapetanovic, every first post-war government is expected to solve two problems: the reconstruction of the country first and the solving of social problems second. How is this government planning to solve them?

[Kapetanovic] In order for this government to attempt to solve problems with the reconstruction of the country, the economy, and social problems, it needs to secure the conditions for solving them. You are aware that we still have not solved certain political issues, even though the Dayton agreement defined them precisely and with more or less precise deadlines. Unfortunately, we are still facing deadlines that should have been met in December. Therefore, before we start solving anything, we need to solve certain political issues, as well as the issue of the Federation Government's work. I will not be coming up with anything new; what has been agreed now needs to be implemented. This means that customs checkpoints have to be established on the federation borders, the federation police must be deployed on the federation borders, checkpoints within the Federation need to be removed, no duties should be charged, etc. This will create conditions for the integration of the Federation. Once people and goods start moving and circulating freely, people will say: "There is light." This will make it possible for the government, as an executive body, to begin work. [passage omitted]

[VECERNJE NOVINE] There are immense differences in the extent of damage in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation between areas under Bosnia-Herzegovina Army control and those under Croatian Defense Council control. On the basis of the development plan, it would be logical to earmark larger funds for the reconstruction of devastated regions in the Federation. Will this be so?

[Kapetanovic] The reconstruction funds will be allocated to those who come up with the best plans. I believe that the government will pass decisions that will encourage such plans. The ones who come up with such projects the fastest, those who achieve a turnover of funds as quickly as possible, thus enabling investment in other projects, those people will get the funds. [passage omitted]

[VECERNJE NOVINE] When do you foresee that the Federation customs service and Federation police will be established on the Federation borders?

[Kapetanovic] Very soon! All departmental ministers in the Federation Government have convinced me that there are currently no obstacles to this.

[VECERNJE NOVINE] What will the Federation Army be like, who will constitute it, how will it be equipped, how will it be paid, and from what financial resources?

[Kapetanovic] This is a very serious problem. It will be a professional army comprising members of the Bosniak, Croatian, and other peoples. It will be trained and equipped according to the administration's program, while its future existence will depend on the degree of development of the Federation itself. [passage omitted]

[VECERNJE NOVINE] The political help of the patrons of the international peace agreement will be strategically directed at reviving the dialogue between the until recently warring factions. In your opinion, how is the process going, and are you satisfied with it?

[Kapetanovic] I have to admit that I am not satisfied, particularly after Mr. Bildt's decision to retain the so-called Serb police in the districts that are supposed to be reintegrated into Sarajevo and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation or in areas where the transition of authority is in progress. I believe that the deadlines in the D+45 Dayton agreement must be met in the same way as they have been met by federation forces in Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo. There is also the question of who these people — the Serb police — are. We have information that they are the "Serb army," that is, their paramilitary forces in police uniforms. Can this army protect the population in Ilidza, Vogosca, Ilijas, and Hadzici? According to our information, they are precisely the ones who are terrorizing the Serb population that wishes to stay. Whenever this particular side implements a point of the Dayton agreement, an obstacle arises, but a tolerant stance toward them is nevertheless maintained. [passage omitted]

The Government and the Media

[VECERNJE NOVINE] What will the government's attitude be toward the media? As things stand now, it is not a good omen that there is no separate information ministry. Do you believe that without it you will be able to prevent possible new divisions among the media? Will Bosnia-Herzegovina Television be divided into national channels?

[Kapetanovic] You can have a ministry that does not work properly and is of no use. The fact that there is no information ministry is a product of talks that were conducted under rather adverse circumstances. If we establish a strong information office within the Education, Science, Culture, and Sports Ministry, I believe that we will have fulfilled our assignment.

I have no reports of any plans to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina Television into national channels, but there have been suggestions to let the cantons have their own television stations and all these stations together will strengthen the central television station.

B-H: Finance Minister Discusses Budget, Banking Reforms

AU2102100796 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 13 Feb 96 p 6

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Finance Minister Dr. Mirsad Kikanovic by Eldin Karic; place and date not given: "General Repair Awaits Banks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chronic lack of money (fresh or any other kind); plenty of reforms; privatization; old foreign currency savings and possibly new ones (this is only for the courageous); tariff (non-)exemptions; and many other problems regarding money are only some the problems awaiting the first peacetime government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly its minister of finance, Dr. Mirsad Kikanovic.

Government Budget

[Karic] In what way and from what means will the government budget be formed?

[Kikanovic] The sources of the government budget are, first of all, 30 percent of the republican customs and consular fees. These are, for the time being, realistic sources, and there will probably be more of them.

[Karic] What about the foreign financing of the government budget? That is, what about the means that could be given by the Islamic countries, Japan, the United States, and the European Union in unequal proportions?

[Kikanovic] Those sources will also exist, but they are still not certain, because some political solutions have been delayed. We are talking about some $160 million. It is scheduled to finance the social fund and some government institutions from that fund.

[Karic] There should be a common currency in the whole territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From what sources will this Bosnia-Herzegovina currency be covered?

[Kikanovic] The domestic currency will primarily be covered by foreign currency, but it will be a much more complicated problem to secure the stability of the currency. However, these are problems that require much more concern, as well as a clearly defined strategy.

[Karic] What are the chances for our citizens to collect their old foreign currency savings, as well as to start new ones?

[Kikanovic] I think it should not happen that those foreign deposits come to naught. In any case, we will try to pay foreign currency savings to the people as soon as possible. If people have trusted banks and given them their foreign currency, and then they become uncertain about their own money, then it will be very hard to gain that confidence again.

Privatization

[Karic] Will the funds gathered from the [state-owned or company-owned] apartment buyouts become part of the government budget?

[Kikanovic] It is hard to say where that apartment buyout money will go because that draft law is still being prepared. The biggest problem is where the majority of people will find means to buy those apartments. First of all, we must give a push to the economy so that the people can get those means.

[Karic] What preconditions will the Ministry of Finance create in order to speed up the process of the transformation of ownership, that is of privatization?

[Kikanovic] The first thing this ministry should do is to create conditions so that financial and stock markets could start operating. The transformation of ownership and privatization will fully depend upon the increased buying power of our citizens. The privatization will most likely be carried out by the distribution of semi-free shares based upon the work so far, some criteria that are to be adopted, participation in the war, various forms of contribution, and so on.

[Karic] Will there be any changes in the tariff policy, and will they be executed in the whole territory of the country?

[Kikanovic] There will be one common tariff policy in the whole territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There will certainly be changes in the tariff policy. One cannot apply the same criteria during the war and after the war. First of all, we have to stabilize and favor domestic production.

Tariff Benefits

[Karic] What about tariff benefits which are applicable only to the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina? Will they be extended to other citizens, too?

[Kikanovic] That law, which offers some benefits to the refugees abroad, has caused a big mess and nothing else. Something has to be changed there, if for nothing else than for the sake of the fighters and the people who have stayed here. We will try to give tariff benefits also to those people who have stayed here all along.

[Karic] Does Bosnia-Herzegovina have its own banks abroad?

[Kikanovic] Unfortunately, it does not. It would be good if our state had one solid bank abroad. Otherwise, the whole banking system of ours should be analyzed, because as it stands, it is not capable of responding to the approaching time.

[Karic] Will there be large banking systems, or a multitude of small ones?

[Kikanovic] It is an exceptionally hard question to say in which direction the reform will develop. In any case, any bank, state or privately owned, will have to work strictly upon economic principles. There will be no coverage from the money issue, but one will try to finance everything from existing sources, and, of course, commercial banks will participate in it.

[Karic] Will there be any concrete financial injections for the banks?

[Kikanovic] Not for the banks directly. There is the Law on the Financial Rehabilitation of Banks. In order to rehabilitate a bank, there must be a significant amount of financial means and there are a lot of preliminary actions that have to be taken.

B-H: Aid Donors Fail To Pay Pledges for Bosnia

LD2102151996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1418 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 21 (TANJUG) — Donor countries and international institutions have failed to meet their aid pledges for the civilian reconstruction of Bosnia, which could undermine a lasting restoration of peace in that former Yugoslav republic, circles at the European Union [EU] said.

Donors met at a multi-national conference in Brussels in December and elicited pledges of aid totalling 550 million dollars to be chanelled through the World Bank for emergency aid projects in Bosnia in the first three months of the year, REUTERS said

The World Bank promised some 150 million dollars, the European Commission pledged just over 100 million dollars and the remainder was pledged by EU member-states, the United States and a group of other countries led by Japan, the agency said.

An official of the EU Commission has confirmed that to date the only money which had actually been handed over was 62.5 million dollars from the European Commission and that no one else had handed over a cent.

The money is intended for projects such as the rebuilding of hospitals, schools, telecommunications systems and reconnecting electricity, gas and water supplies.

A second pledging conference planned in April should deal with longer-term reconstruction projects such as road and rail links and housing.

However, EU sources said that the non-appearance of the December aid money raised fundamental questions about the sense of holding a second conference of donors.

They said there were many reasons for the failure of the aid donors to pay their pledges, ranging from the World Bank wanting to sort out the debt of the former Yugoslavia to the U.S. budget crisis.

Whatever the reasons, it poses a threat to the civilian reconstruction process, the sources said.

B-H: Commentary Views Lack of Foreign Investment

AU2102172096 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 96 p 2

[Commentary by Hamza Baksic: "Miserable Wretch"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A prominent place in any possible anthology of Bosnian selamets [peace agreements] would certainly be occupied by the stories of the rivers of capital that were supposed to flow into our burnt homes as soon as we decided to fire our last shot.

The promises were part of how the war duped us with optimism and were largely useful white lies, if there are such things as useful white lies. With a gun in our hand and shells exploding above our heads, we had to have something more appealing than a realistic picture of postwar Bosnia in order to survive in the crater in which nervous breakdowns — as it will turn out — were worse than the physical wounds regularly catalogued in the war statistics.

Now, with the end of the war, or the possible end of the war, the fear of death has given way to a fear of life. The money, without which one cannot get the broken cog-wheels of Bosnian economy moving, is not coming in. The donators have been calling one another up, the authorities in both entities have mostly been waiting with different proposals resulting from the different natures of each of the authorities, and the days are passing by. The decision of the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] to start investing money in a gradual program of glazing windows in Sarajevo is the first and only sign that there really is someone who truly believes that shells will never pound the streets of Sarajevo again. Unfortunately, it is neither a sufficient sign nor a sufficient change for a city with the wounds of Sarajevo.

I mention glass because the plastic sheets over the windows make all the stories about changes seem rather fanciful. They imprison Sarajevans within the confines of their apartments, the space in which they passed their lives during the war. They are also imprisoned within those confines by the poverty and distrust acquired during the war. First of all, they are imprisoned by the fact that they, perhaps still under influence of selamet mentality, believed that everything would move much faster after Dayton, that the world was as fed up with the war in Bosnia as we were, so that the so-called international community would do everything possible to put an end to the Bosnian nightmare.

The cost of the first phase of the economic reanimation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is incomparably lower than, for instance, the cost of maintaining UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] here. They are also lower than the cost of IFOR [Implementation Force], even if the foreign troops stay on our territory as long as is envisaged. In effect, since Dayton, IFOR has spent more money on hiring offices and facilities in Croatia, than healthy capital has arrived in Bosnia. Even the Islamic countries have proven more willing to give sedaka [charitable aid] than economic help through international institutions.

One of the reasons is certainly that Bosnia-Herzegovina society, on the territory of both entities, has neither economy-based programs nor the expert and legislative infrastructure necessary to implement such programs. Capital will come into Bosnia-Herzegovina, when it does come, to satisfy its own needs and to make profits, not to satisfy what Bosnia-Herzegovina or its authorities deem necessary. As a rule, they will ask for what we do not want to give.

Meanwhile, everything that has not been done to achieve the conditions for the arrival of foreign capital remains unimportant compared with the basic fact of the assessment of the stability of peace in Bosnia. This country has been penetrated by foreign intelligence services. It has hardly any political or military secret that is not available to the foreigners. One should not spread or nurture any illusions about this: The appropriate intelligence apparatus goes along with such a mighty military power as IFOR and, even if there were no IFOR, this country would be interesting enough in any case.

From the fact that capital, that famous miserable wretch, is not coming to Bosnia, one could conclude that its owners have information on the mentality here and the desire to keep the war option alive. Every incident, every tension, makes capital even more reserved and nervous. Its procrastinating, or giving up altogether, increases the tensions and creates the possibility that incidents coming from free interpretations of the peace agreement will become well established.

With the changes in eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, the world's hunger for capital has increased many times over. The advantage of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a political one, since it is the only active crisis center in Europe and the Mediterranean and that advantage will grow as the situation calms down. Bosnia-Herzegovina also has economic advantages over its competitors, principally an advantage in terms of the workforce, if a labor market free from any political criteria is formed and the conditions arise for the return of the top-level experts who caved in under the war pressures. Thus, foreign investment will be the measure of domestic circumstances.

B-H: Karadzic Speaks on Serb Refugee Issue

LD2102164996 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 57th session of the Serb Republic Assembly is under way in Pale. [passage omitted]

A draft law on abandoned property provoked most discussion. Speaking about the need for the urgent adoption of this law, Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic said, among other things:

[Begin Karadzic recording] We have Sarajevans who are currently on the move — around 540,000 refugees. This number includes people who had earlier fled central Bosnia — they had not even thought they would be part of the Serb Republic — they voted and fought for the Serb Republic, knowing that their property and their villages would not be in the Serb Republic. This number also includes people from Visoka [High] Krajina [as heard] who hoped and believed together with all of us that this would be Serb Republic, Sarajevans who also believed they would live in the Serb Republic, and the Neretva valley that also hoped it would be Serb Republic, and so on. This also includes some people from the Serb Krajina — we accommodated around 60,000 people, if I am not mistaken, and many more such people who would like to return from Serbia.

We have to adopt a law whereby we take over this property and distribute it for use; with regard to ownership, we will wait. The state is currently the owner. We have to stand up for our refugees, assume responsibility for that property, and be responsible for compensation. This is very important for us — people who fled Drvar should be helped as much as possible out of the property abandoned by our enemies — if they had not been our enemies they would not have left. Then we can say to the new owners that they should come to us with all their problems, we will see then. [end recording]. [passage omitted]

B-H: Koljevic Protests Unequal Treatment for Serbs

LD2102185996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1810 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 21 Feb (SRNA) — The Dayton agreement firmly stands for the cessation of the war, but the arrest of two Serb officers shows that all sides are not being treated equally, Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today.

He said that "the [Bosnian] Serb Assembly should set out its standpoint on the question of the Hague tribunal's indictment of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic, and General Ratko Mladic, and clearly say that the sentencing of these two would be tantamount to the sentencing of the Serb people and the army as a whole."

Addressing the Serb Republic Assembly deputies, the vice president suggested that the assembly should oblige all parties to set out their views on strategic national goals before the elections.

"In this context the strengthening of relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is of vital importance, while relations with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation should be understood in terms of our economic interests."

"I believe it would be a good thing if the assembly were to adopt a declaration in which it could present an overview of its achievements so far, so that the future assembly could have guidelines for its continuous work," Koljevic said.

B-H: Socialists Assail Karadzic, Koljevic Behavior

LD2102210896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2101 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Feb 21 (TANJUG) — Bosnian Serb socialists have condemned in the strongest terms statements made by President Radovan Karadzic and Parliament Speaker Nikola Koljevic as being sharply at variance with the stands put forth at Rome by Premier Rajko Kasagic.

The Socialist Party of the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska issued a statement to this effect and forwarded a copy to TANJUG on Wednesday.

The party expressed the strongest condemnation of this behaviour as disturbing the people and plunging Serb Sarajevo still deeper into despair and hopelessness.

Furthermore, with this kind of behaviour, these officials continue to irritate the international community, delaying the lifting of sanctions against the Republika Srpska, it added.

The officials' flying in the face of the world has brought only suffering and trouble to the people, the statement said.

The statements of Karadzic and Koljevic that run contrary to the stands quite rightly presented by Premier Rajko Kasagic at Rome disturb the people and challenge the constitution on which the government and the premier base their actions, it added.

The party therefore strongly demanded that this kind of behaviour stop in the interest of the people and that all civilian and military authorities cooperate to the best of their abilities in the implementation of the peace accord.

The Rome summit on Bosnia on the weekend made a great contribution to the consolidation of peace and the establishment of mutual trust among the erstwhile enemies in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska Socialists said.

B-H: Former Prime Minister Silajdzic Forms New Party

AU2202115596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Silajdzic Has Formed 'Our Bosnia'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The former prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic, has been working recently on the registration of a new party and the selection of a new team. As we have learned, a lot of young people are standing by the prime minister, and a great number of our citizens from abroad are calling and asking for application forms for admission to the party. NOVA BOSNA learns that the already formed party led by Silajdzic will be called "Our Bosnia."

Silajdzic has obtained the initial means for financing the party from George Soros and, according to rumors, aid has been promised and offered by Islamic countries where the former prime minister has a lot of friends. Support has been also expressed by the United States. The former prime minister is seriously preparing for the election campaign and the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina scheduled for 22 September.

B-H: SDA Official Views Elections, Western Influence

AU2202100496 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 96 p 5

[Interview with Halid Genjac, chairman of the Main Board of the ruling SDA, by Edo Ekmescic; place and date not given: "Historic Challenges Shape a Platform"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Government That Governs

[Ekmescic] Will staff changes in the leadership of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] bring about some more substantial changes of the platform?

[Genjac] The fundamental principles of our party comprised by the platform are still topical. They are confirmed and will be confirmed as permanent guidelines. Necessary changes to our platform in terms of expansion will be influenced more by historic challenges of the current time than by personnel changes. We view personnel changes in the party's bodies as the creation of preconditions that are necessary for strengthening the party's organizational structure, since more adequate territorial representation has been accomplished. I expect firmer discipline in the party's structure from bottom to top, better efficiency, and a greater presence of the party's officials in the field.

[Ekmescic] What will the SDA do regarding the return of refugees to their homes?

[Genjac] The SDA considers the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes as a vital interest of the Bosniaks. The prevention of refugees' return to their homes and of Bosniaks' repossession of real estate is a global strategy pursued by the aggressor, aimed at depriving Bosniaks of their living space. It is extremely important to punish those who committed war crimes and thus implemented the idea of an ethnically pure state. That is one of the most important preconditions for a mass return of displaced persons to their homes. The SDA considers it of vital interest that Bosniaks keep their ownership of real estate throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, because without that the Bosniaks cannot survive as a people or preserve their state.

[Ekmescic] When will displaced persons within the Federation return to their homes?

[Ganjac] The return of displaced persons to their homes within the Federation is closely bound up with and conditioned by the establishment of municipal, cantonal, and federal authorities, according to the principles stated in the Constitution of the Federation. That means not only on paper, but rather the establishment of real administrative bodies with full capacities and real authority.

Platform for Elections

[Ekmescic] Do you think the West will influence results of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Ganjac] Attempts by the West to influence the elections are evident already. I think a concept of dividing people from intelligentsia can already be perceived, and there will probably be additional concepts for dividing the Bosniaks in other respects as well. As the elections are approach, such attempts will become more and more severe, and certainly characterized by the political goals and interests of the West. Those interests are most frequently opposed to the preservation of the religious, moral, cultural, and spiritual values of the Bosniaks. The majority of Bosniaks have understood and learned that, and, for that reason, I think we shall know how and be able to resist the West's influence on the results of the elections.

[Ekmescic] What are the basic principles of the SDA's platform with which it will run in the elections?

[Genjac] In such tumultuous and fateful times for our people, it is difficult to summarize the platform of the party that mobilizes the bulk of our people. I shall state just some of the major goals envisaged by the SDA platform: An integral and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, a multi-party system and power concentrated in the parliament, the search for missing persons, the return of refugees, progress that does not exclude the preservation of the religious, moral, and traditional values of the Bosniaks, the return of property to the Islamic community that was taken away from it by the former regime, particular care for the disabled and the families of fallen soldiers, strengthening the unity of the Bosniak people, a market-orientated economy alongside the transformation of ownership, the reorganization of the Army that will guarantee our security, and so forth.

[Ekmescic] What do you think about the opposition?

[Genjac] I think our opposition has not achieved its profile yet as an opposition that is normally necessary and desirable in the parliamentary life of any state, including ours. Objectively, the conditions never existed for such profile. Still, I think that, in the current circumstances as well, the opposition could act more as a real critic, rather than a fault-finder, with more well-founded arguments and objectivity and with less sensationalism; with more responsibility when dealing with the fateful questions for our people and state, and with less fawning over Western mentors, and so forth.

Croatia: Granic, UK Minister Sign Agreements

LD2102175496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, and Nicholas Bonsor, minister of state in the British Foreign Office, have signed two interstate agreements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zagreb. Anabela Lajkauf reports:

[Lajkauf] Agreements on air traffic and cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation between the governments of Great Britain and Croatia were described by both ministers as very important for the future development of cooperation between the two countries. Minister Granic said he is confident the agreements will contribute to the further development of relations between Great Britain and Croatia and added:

[Granic] "We discussed other important issues, in particular the situation in our region, and we are very pleased by the establishment of the joint police in Mostar, and the agreement on Mostar, as well as the Rome summit agreements concerning the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation."

[Lajkauf] The Croatian foreign minister also said there is still a great deal of scope for the improvement of economic relations between the two countries, and said:

[Granic] "We are grateful for the support of Great Britain for the Republic of Croatia and the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, the process of the normalization of relations with Belgrade, as well as the process of our integration in Europe, especially in relation to full membership in the European Council and our integration in West European security mechanisms, such as the Partnership for Peace." [passage omitted]

Croatia: Draft Law on Cooperation With Hague Viewed

AU2202113096 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Feb 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Dr. Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Croatia, by Drazen Curic; place and date not given: "It Is Impossible To Compare Aggressors' Crimes and Victims!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft constitutional law on the Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the International Court of Justice in The Hague, recently completed by the government and sent into parliamentary procedure, has aroused great interest but also contradictory opinions among the Croatian general public. The draft law, apart from creating the legal preconditions for the activity of the International Tribunal in Croatia, also regulates the extradition of Croatian citizens accused of war crimes. That draft law, which will absolutely certainly be adopted by the National Assembly, is significant also because the Croatian state is transferring a very important and sensitive part of its sovereignty onto one international institution. In this interview given to VJESNIK, Dr. Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, Deputy Prime Minister, tells us about the doubts, pressures, and requests that the Croatian Government met with on the occasion of adoption of the draft law.

[Curic] In the explanation of the draft constitutional law on cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the government, beside other things, states that the making of that law represents the fulfilling of the obligations resulting from Resolution 827 of the United Nations adopted as early as in 1993. Why is this draft law being made only now?

[Mintas-Hodak] It has taken some time to prepare the law. Once we had decided to make the law, we gathered and compared the solutions of foreign legislations. The draft law has been made also upon the model of the law made in the Council of Europe. Based upon that, the Ministry of Justice formed an expert team to prepare the final draft. As you know, a law takes some time to prepare, so that is also one of the reasons why the procedure for this draft law is only now taking place.

Evidence Collection Phase

[Curic] Why is this constitutional law being adopted?

[Mintas-Hodak] Because by the application of the Statute of the International Tribunal, which is incorporated in Resolution 827, the Republic of Croatia transfers a part of its judicial authority onto the international body, in this case the International Tribunal in The Hague. Further, this draft law also regulates how Croatian citizens are to be delivered to the International Tribunal, so also therefore the government has estimated that such a procedure to adopt the law is necessary.

[Curic] So, it is not necessary to change the whole Constitution?

[Mintas-Hodak] No, that is our appraisal.

[Curic] One of the chapters of the law talks about the communication of the Republic of Croatia with the International Tribunal. How will they communicate?

[Mintas-Hodak] They will communicate through the government which, as the law says, is also the agent of cooperation in the name of the Republic of Croatia with the International Tribunal. The government, of course, can form separate bodies to carry out certain activities in the cooperation. It has already done so by forming the War Crimes Committee and appointing its observer at the International Court of Justice. If need be, the government can form other ad hoc bodies that it deems necessary.

[Curic] In what phase is the investigation carried out by the Governmental War Crimes Committee?

[Mintas-Hodak] I am not a member of the committee, so I cannot give you a straight answer. I know that the committee exists, and that it consists of five members, and its chairman is the state attorney Mr. Hranjski. The committee is active, it cooperates with the representatives of the International Tribunal, particularly with the attorney general, and I mostly think that cooperation in this phase is developing on collecting evidence.

[Curic] Can you tell us any concrete names that the Croatian side will insist to be judged in The Hague?

[Mintas-Hodak] Croatia has given a lot of information on the war crimes that were committed, particularly in the first phase of the aggression on Croatia. The war criminals are mostly members of the former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army] and the Chetniks. All materials and evidence have been forwarded to the International Tribunal.

[Curic] What about consideration of the request to extradite seven Croats?

[Mintas-Hodak] There are such requests, it is no secret. There is the request to extradite them, however, their surrender, regarding the provisions of our Constitution and law at the moment is not possible. Therefore we have not fulfilled the requests of the International Tribunal. The International Tribunal has understood that, and it has even offered advice and suggestions, and its help in preparing this law.

[Curic] Some analysts claim that the adoption of this law is the result of pressure from the international community?

[Mintas-Hodak] This law is certainly an act that will provide more efficient cooperation in the part that refers to the extradition of the accused. The extradition of Croatian citizens, without such a law, I repeat, would not be in line with the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Croatia.

[Curic] So, after the adoption of this law, Croatia will most likely extradite its citizens.

[Mintas-Hodak] The law regulates the question of procedure, and other legal preconditions that have to be fulfilled for the Croatian court to fulfill the requests of the International Tribunal.

Inadequate Efficiency of the Court in The Hague

[Curic] And what will the extradition procedure look like?

[Mintas-Hodak] It is regulated by the law.

[Curic] Who makes the decision on the very act of extradition?

[Mintas-Hodak] In the first instance, the County Court, and in the second the Supreme Court in the Tribunal with up to five judges. That is one of the possible solutions, although it has been solved differently in the judicial practice of some European countries.

[Curic] In your contacts with the representatives of the International Tribunal, have you gained the impression that some additional charges will be brought against the Croats?

[Mintas-Hodak] I have had no concrete talks about that. We have been talking mostly about the charges already brought and the requests for extradition. Naturally, also about the legal preconditions that the Republic of Croatia should create in order to form circumstances for normal cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague.

[Curic] In your opinion, to what extent has the International Tribunal been politicized? It is obvious, namely, that some charges against the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were brought precisely at the time of the Dayton negotiations, that is, at the moment when those two sides were supposed to make certain concessions.

[Mintas-Hodak] For the time being it is hard to say to what degree that International Court of Justice will be objective and independent in its work. It is a fact, meanwhile, that it is active and works in a very sensible and politicized environment, and that in such an environment it is hard to resist political pressures and influences. It is apparent that such a political environment influences the efficiency of the Hague Tribunal and the Republic of Croatia has pointed this out on many occasions. We are particularly dissatisfied with the work of the investigative organs in collecting evidence, and bringing charges against all of those on the Serb side who have committed crimes. On the occasion of the last visit of John Shattuck, assistant U.S. secretary of state for human rights, we were given assurances that the United States will do everything for its part in order to increase the efficiency of the Tribunal in that area.

[Curic] How many charges have been brought against the persons who committed crimes in Croatia? Are there still only three JNA officers?

[Mintas-Hodak] For the time being, I think that charges have been brought only against the three of them.

[Curic] What requests have been made by the Croatian Government?

[Mintas-Hodak] We request that charges should be brought for the mass murders committed all over former occupied areas in Croatia. So, not only for the crimes in and around Vukovar, but also for the crimes in Skabrnja, Saborsko, Vocin, Petrinja, and other places.

[Curic] Does Croatia insist upon the trial of Milan Martic, who in the end admitted that he ordered the shelling of Zagreb?

[Mintas-Hodak] Yes, Croatia has delivered all the evidence of Milan Martic's crimes to the International Tribunal.

[Curic] The fact that so far no charges have been brought against Muslims creates additional suspicion regarding the objectivity of the International Tribunal.

[Mintas-Hodak] In our contacts with the representatives of the International Tribunal we have been told that the Tribunal had been collecting data and evidence also against some Muslims, and that bringing charges against a certain number of Muslims was possible very soon.

[Curic] You have recently said that it is impossible to compare the issue of crimes from the Serb and the Croatian side. You have said that on the Croatian side, if there were any crimes at all, those were individual cases, while on the other side, with the Serbs, one can talk about a systematic genocide policy.

[Mintas-Hodak] I think that it is in itself clear that the ethnic cleansing in the territories occupied first by the JNA, and then by paramilitary units, had all the characteristics of genocide. So, according to that, the war crimes committed in those territories cannot be treated the same way as possible individual crimes committed on the Croatian side.

[Curic] In what way will the verdict reached by the International Tribunal be executed?

[Mintas-Hodak] The Tribunal makes a decision on every individual case.

[Curic] To what Tribunal do you refer?

[Mintas-Hodak] To the Tribunal in The Hague. With this draft law, Croatia creates preconditions to enable it to be a candidate for one of the countries in whose prisons the convicts could serve their time. Of course, it depends upon the Hague Tribunal to what extent Croatian readiness will be accepted.

One Must Fulfill Certain Conditions

[Curic] In your opinion, what is the most delicate part of the draft law?

[Mintas-Hodak] It is normal that the most delicate part is the one that speaks of the extradition of Croatian citizens.

[Curic] How far is it inconsistent with the Croatian Constitution?

[Mintas-Hodak] The Croatian Constitution does not allow the extradition of Croatian citizens to another state. Not only our law, but the constitutional provisions of the majority of countries are similar, regarding that question. However, every country, every member of the international community, as we are, sacrifices a part of its sovereignty by accepting obligations from the international conventions that it has signed, ratified, and made public.

[Curic] Does the Republic of Croatia reserve the right to refuse extradition of some person requested by the International Tribunal, even after the adoption of this law?

[Mintas-Hodak] If the conditions prescribed by this law are not satisfied, then it will not extradite.

[Curic] Does that mean that if it extradites its citizens, Croatia is practically admitting that some of its citizens have been accused of crimes with good reason?

[Mintas-Hodak] Only the court decides about the reliability of the accusation in the procedure which is prescribed for the determination of the responsibility of a certain person.

[Curic] Which court?

[Mintas-Hodak] In this case, when the point in question is the charge of war crimes brought by the International Tribunal in the Hague, it [the Hague Tribunal] makes the decision.

[Curic] How can the Croatian side make the selection of the persons to extradite, then?

[Mintas-Hodak] I have already said that it will depend upon whether all the conditions prescribed by this draft law are fulfilled.

[Curic] In your opinion, what is the reaction of the Croatian general public to the making of this draft law?

[Mintas-Hodak] The public is probably divided. On one side there are those who salute the establishment of an international body to punish all those who have committed war crimes. Certainly a large number of Croatian citizens do not approve of trying Croats, who were the attacked side in this war and who only defended themselves. So, as much as from the legal and political viewpoint one can say that cooperation with the International Tribunal is needed, one cannot justify it and it is very difficult to accept the fact that today nobody discusses the fact of who caused and started the war at all, that is, who is in fact guilty for the crime against peace in this region.

[Box, p 6]

I Have No Such Ambitions

[Curic] Recently, some media have been speaking about you as the future prime minister.

[Mintas-Hodak] Those are utterly arbitrary claims, very likely conceived and launched in order to indicate the instability of this government. I have no such ambitions regarding the prime minister's office, and, as far as I know, there is no serious debate about it anywhere. I assure you that Prime Minister Matesa is an exceptionally capable and well-chosen person for the prime minister's office, and that the Government is determined to fulfill the task it has been entrusted with.

[Box, p 7]

Everything Is Possible

We asked Dr. Mintas-Hodak:

[Curic] Precisely today (Friday) the term expires when President Tudjman should make up his mind about the mayor [of Zagreb] Rados. Since you are deputy prime minister in charge of social affairs, do you perhaps know what the decision will be?

[Mintas-Hodak] I really do not know, because the president makes the decision.

[Curic] According to what you know about it, which possibility is more probable?

[Mintas-Hodak] I think it is useless to guess.

[Curic] Are new elections possible?

[Mintas-Hodak] Everything is possible.

Croatia: Iranian Embassy Lacks News on Detained Iranians

AU2202113596 Paris AFP in English 1033 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 22 (AFP)—The Iranian Embassy said here on Thursday that it has not heard from nine Iranians detained in the Croat-held part of Bosnia and accused in engaging in Islamic revolutionary propaganda.

"Unfortunately we are without news and the only information we have is from the local press," the embassy's second secretary, Mohamed Javad Hemat Panah, told AFP.

He said Iranian officials had asked the embassy in Sarajevo to inquire about their fate and had protested to Bosnian Croat officials "who had no reason to arrest them because they are religious people."

Earlier in Tehran Thursday, the official IRNA news agency quoted a foreign ministry official as saying that the nine men are reciters of the Moslem holy book travelling the region to organize concerts.

The unidentified official said the group was part of a "Tavashikh" choir invited by an Islamic society in Bosnia-Hercegovina to perform for two weeks for the Moslem holy fasting month of Ramadan, which ended Tuesday.

They were on their way to Croatia, at the invitation of Croatian Mufti Omar Basheikh, to stage programs there when they were arrested "by extremist Croats opposed to a federation between Bosnian Moslems and Croats," the agency said.

Bosnian Croat radio said that Croat police had arrested the Iranians after suspecting them of having entered Bosnia "to implant the principles" of Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution "in the country."

It said they were travelling from Tesanj to Bihac in the northwestern Bosnia when they were arrested on Saturday at a checkpoint.

The Croat news agency Hina reported Wednesday that Bosnian Croats were NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the former Yugoslav republic.

Croatia: E. Slavonian Serbs Criticize Zagreb

AU2102184696 Beli Manastir Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Feb 96

[Broadcast in progress]

[FBIS Translated Text] ...in the municipality of Beli Manastir is satisfactory. The Baranja division is carrying out all its tasks successfully and responsibly. The demarcation lines towards the Croatian side are under absolute control. The defense forces are completely observing the peace agreement, but are still on alert.

These are some of the statements from today's session of the executive council of Beli Manastir municipal assembly, during which reports on the political and security situation and public law and order were considered.

It was pointed out that the Croatian side was trying to avoid the obligations contained in the Dayton agreement and was using psychological war propaganda methods with the aim of getting the Serb people who are determined to continue to live in this area to change their minds.

Moreover, the readiness to cooperate with the civilian and military structures of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] was confirmed. It was also stated that demilitarization would begin as soon as UNTAES forces are deployed in the Srem [Serb word for Srijem]-Baranja province. However, although the modalities of the demilitarization have not yet been agreed upon, it is quite certain that it will not imply that the Serb side is to be disarmed. Therefore, even after the demilitarization process has been carried out, the Baranja division and the Srem-Baranja corps will continue to carry out their main functions.

Cooperation between the civilian and military authorities in the Beli Manastir municipality was said to be highly successful and it was decided that coordination be continually developed at all levels in order to provide all the necessary conditions for the functioning of the defense forces in the area. Moreover, the executive council unanimously decided that the responsible bodies should intensify the fight against crime and protect all Baranja's resources.

The need for the official authorities to become fully engaged in protection and observance of the basic human and civil rights of the non-Serb population in Baranja was also stressed.

Croatia: Serbs Expect FRY To Help Settle E. Slavonia

AU2202080996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Feb 96

[Report by Petko Koprivica]

[FBIS Translated Text] Petko Koprivica, Beli Manastir TV editor, has prepared a report on the program for the settlement and housing of the displaced persons from the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina in the municipality of Beli Manastir. He talked to a refugee, Dr. Dusan Zigic; Milan Vujic, deputy president of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly; and the head of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] civilian affairs, Gerard Fisher.

[Koprivica] The Serb side has been consistent in observing the agreement signed in Erdut by the representatives of the Srem-Baranja province and Croatia on 12 November last year. This document guarantees all the citizens of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia the right to settle in the Srem-Baranja area, which includes all the Serbs expelled from western Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, and northern Dalmatia.

About 500 families have been accommodated in Baranja this year alone. The displaced persons were granted use of houses or apartments, many even have permanent jobs. Most of the available housing facilities are damaged—installations destroyed, houses demolished—but the people are carrying out the most necessary repairs and thus making for themselves the necessary shelter. They say it is better to live this way than in collective accommodation facilities, in halls or community centers. Many are hoping to return to their houses in the western parts of Krajina after all.

[Zigic] I came from Korenica immediately after Operation Stor. I lived temporarily with a relative in Belgrade, but our status was not resolved, and I could not find a job there. Now the opportunity arose for me to get a job in Baranja, which I have taken. There is a great demand for people of my profession, and I came here with my family. We have temporary accommodation, and I think this is a transitional solution, and we can probably not live here either, one day we will all have to return to where we used to live and work, where we were born, and where we will be able to live again.

[Koprivica] The project has the full support of international humanitarian and political forces. There are indications that its implementation will be accompanied by substantial foreign investment, and it is expected that the FRY, that is, Serbia, will also help. The settlement project will not yield the desired results without a proper program for the restoration and development of the economy and all the other spheres of life in this area.

[Vujic] The economy of Baranja can take in some of the people who were expelled from the western parts of the Krajina, regardless of the fact that it has been destroyed to quite a considerable extent in the past five years. Some of the people who decide to come this area will be able to find jobs in agriculture, [word indistinct], and other parts of our economy.

However, in order for the people who are supposed to come to the area to be accommodated, investment is necessary. For instance, a 100-million dinar injection is necessary for the Belje part of the Baranja agriculture to be revived. We expect part of these funds to be provided by the international community, and we also expect we may be given loans by the federal state.

[Koprivica] As has been confirmed in Dayton, the Erdut Agreement also makes it possible for Croat refugees to return, but as the U. S. ambassador in Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, pointed out the other day, the return of the Croat refugees to their houses in the Srijem-Baranja province will not be implemented in such a way that the Serbs who are currently in these houses once again become homeless.

[Galbraith, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Any person who used to live in Croatia, which includes the people from the Krajina or western Slavonia, has the right to live in any place in Croatia. Any citizen has the right to live where they want; this is a basic human right. The best solution for the Serbs who left the Krajina and western Slavonia is not to come here; efforts should be made for these people to return to their own homes. We believe that the Government of Croatia must do everything possible to create the security conditions for people to return to their homes.

[Koprivica] Finally, let us remind the viewers of the fact that during his recent visit to Erdut, Ambassador Galbraith repeated the promises he has given by the Croat side. The first is that no Serb who arrived in Srem-Baranja province from other parts of Croatia will have to leave a Croat house before the issue of their accommodation is permanently resolved. The second is that Croatia will provide financial compensation to the Serbs who wish to return to their homes and restore them.

[Unidentified correspondent] Gerard Fisher, head of UNTAES civilian affairs, also issued a statement about the settlement program. Asked what his comment to the program was, and to what extent UNTAES will be prepared to help, Mr. Fisher said:

[Fisher, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Regarding this issue, I would shortly like to consider the issue of displaced persons. The suffering of these people [word indistinct] independently of where they came from. The problem should be resolved together with the international community, particularly the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], who will find [words indistinct] (?constitutional) policy.

I do not wish to comment on the [words indistinct], but I would like to say that the UN transitional administration should view the refugee problem using the same standards. We cannot create two different kinds of citizenship—if someone is a Croatian Serb, their rights should be observed regardless of whether they come from. The return to their homes should be actualized through us, either through compensation for lost property or through (?reconstruction). We should work together in order to find the best solution. Nobody should have to leave the houses in which they are temporarily getting something in return. This is not our intention.

Croatia: Matesa Says Belgrade Supports Rail Strikers

LD2202132596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian Government met today to discuss a wide-ranging agenda. A report was submitted on the negotiations with the trade unions. Sanja Rabuzin-Pavic has a report:

[Rabuzin-Pavic] The Croatian Government is open to social dialogue with the trade unions but not to a monologue accompanied by pressure, Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa said. In its policy the Croatian Government proceeds from the need to safeguard the rights of the employed and to speed up the process of collective negotiations. Relevant ministers have been instructed to persevere in their dialogue with the trade unions.

The prime minister also said that the railway strike is taking place at the expense of the tax payer, since a larger proportion of the budget is earmarked for railway workers and their salaries than for refugees. The demand for a 100 percent pay rise is totally unacceptable, and the government will not succumb to pressures, the prime minister said.

Speaking about the strikes and the negotiations with the trade unions, the prime minister said that he has seen a letter of support for the union of independent trade unions sent by the Nezavisnost [Independence] trade union of Belgrade. The prime minister asked: Need we say more? [passage omitted]

Croatia: Protest Strikes Against Salary Freeze

LD2102174896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1739 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 21 (TANJUG)—Several thousand workers protested along the streets of Zagreb on Wednesday, demanding an abolishment of the government decision to freeze salaries and an increase of the lowest wages.

The basic demand is that collective contracts determine salaries of employees in economic and public companies, and not decrees and government regulations, the protesters said.

The protests came after a postal workers' strike throughout Croatia on Tuesday, and Croatian rail workers have announced a strike for Thursday.

FYROM: Crvenkovski Sets Out Goals of New Government

AU2102213296 Skopje MIC in English 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At today's parliamentary session, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski explained the reasons that have led to the reconstruction of the Government in his address, saying, among the rest, that the Government is not a debating club, and that it is expected to function efficiently. Crvenkovski underlined that with this proposal, the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] would have a Government with clearly located political responsibility, concluding that despite all the results that have been achieved after the parliamentary elections, it has not functioned entirely as a political government so far. "There can be no lasting political partnership if one of the partner intends to take part [in] only the fame and success, but does not intend to bear responsibility when problems and difficulties arise," Crvenkovski said, explaining the reason why the new Government will not have the to-date coalition partner, the Liberal Party, any longer.

In his longer address, Crvenkovski stated that the new Government will continue to realize the election platform of the Alliance for Macedonia, and that these program goals should not be monopolized by the three political parties, participants in the election coalition Alliance for Macedonia. "The program goals should be promoted more extensively, to become a subject of broader national, political and social consensus."

In regard to the "tense atmosphere surrounding the attitude of certain political subjects toward the President of the Republic Kiro Gligorov," Crvenkovski said that some political parties, which have self-proclaimed themselves as protectors of the President, have made a big mistake. The first reason is that the President enjoys such high personal respect and trust, both in the country and abroad, that he has no need for defenders. In this context, Crvenkovski asked them "not to protect Gligorov from SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia]. Do not defend him from the party with which he had the closest cooperation and respect in the past period, which was one of the rare, if not the only party which, after the event of 3 October, did not make or even think of making any calculations about possible candidates at the presidential elections." The Prime Minister was confident that this cooperation will continue in order to coordinate the political thoughts over a long range period.

The new Government of the Republic of Macedonia will carry on with an equally expressed will for cooperation with all neighbors, Crvenkovski explained, showing an interest for a full normalization of the relations with the only neighbor—FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], with which Macedonia has still not established diplomatic relations. He reminded that Macedonia is on the verge of regulating its relations with the European Union, which will require a total coordination of a number of departments in the Macedonian Government.

Furthermore, following its access into "Partnership for Peace," Macedonia will make efforts to improve its cooperation with NATO, so that it itself can become a part of this collective security system. Crvenkovski dismissed criticism that the to-date Macedonian policy was too pro-American and pro-Western, saying that Macedonia can only benefit from its similar views with the United States.

The economic reforms and structural changes will continue in Macedonia. The process of privatization should be finalized, to encompass all sectors. Namely, the agricultural combines, cooperatives and parts of the public sector. Immediately after the realization of the STAND-BY arrangement, negotiations will start with the IMF for signing the three-year ISAF arrangement.

Crvenkovski admitted that the primary problem in Macedonia is the shortage of working capital for financing the production and re-starting the shut down capacities. "Therefore, we will have to make a maximum concentration of all foreign credit lines, i.e. the entire domestic financial potential."

In the sphere of the political system, the Criminal Code is presently in government procedure, Crvenkovski said. He added that a Law on territorial division of the Republic of Macedonia should be brought this spring, as well as the Law on local elections, so as to be able to organize local elections by the end of the year, and to constitute new municipalities, in accordance with the Law on local self-management.

Crvenkovski announced a new intensity in the fight against crime, corruption and bribes.

FYROM: Attempt To 'Isolate' Gligorov Viewed

AU2102112696 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Feb 96 p 13

[Article by Erol Rizaov: "Pyrrhic Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are colossal and turbulent developments under way on the political scene in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] that are engendering visible hesitation and confusion among the people. People are openly worried that the current tension could break through the democratic rules and have widespread consequences. The way in which the previous allies (and they have been quarreling for a long time)—the Social Democrats and the Liberals—which make up the ruling government coalition, are splitting up after a year in power is giving rise to strong clashes that have the symptoms of a possible political crisis.

Unfortunately, the forecast that, after 3 October, that is, the day someone tried to assassinate President Gligorov, nothing would be the same again, has come true in the worst possible way.

Regarding the new arrangement of the political forces, that is, the "reconstruction of the government"—and this is what some political strategists and party ideologists believed the assassins' main objective was—a new political map is now being created in Macedonia. First, there is the newly imposed position of state president, Kiro Gligorov. This does not involve his constitutional powers as state president, but his changed political position as leader of the Alliance for Macedonia, which does not exist any more. Second, the message of the coalition ruling partners is absolutely clear—push the Liberal Party into a "strong opposition," as an element of the reconstructed government. The new and radically reconstructed government will have a new role in strengthening the positions of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], not only because of the removal of the Liberals, but also because of the rearrangement of the forces in the government itself. The Assembly chairman was bluntly recommended to sit in the Assembly as an opposition leader. Furthermore, if relations become any tenser, there are open fears that some Liberals who are acting as managers of public enterprises, communal leaders, and managers of small-scale enterprises might be "cut off." Actually, this reconstruction implies that there has been a complete power takeover without new elections.

Relations with the Albanian parties, it seems, will continue to be "under bargain," according to what can be seen from the new list of ministers and deputy ministers. We will soon see the profit and the results of all this.

The leaders of the Socialist Party have missed the chance that small parties usually have in moments like this. They accepted small and insignificant positions without any conditions, although they could have asked for at least as much as the Albanian parties got. It is hard to believe that the SDSM could remain in coalition only with the PDP.

"Macedonian Salad"

All this political tumult could be the logical, normal, and ordinary political resolution in the case of the coalition partners having serious conceptual differences on strategic issues. Finally, all over the world coalitions have a finite duration. They often split up. However, it is very important to see whether in Macedonia there is something specific, something that is outside the rules of the game, something that gives grounds for serious concern. Are we not serving the world another "Macedonian salad" whose contents are barely recognizable as simple and clear ingredients of known origin?

It is an illusion to assert that a competition among strong players exists simply because the wish of the voting body that has voted for the platform of the Alliance for Macedonia has to be taken into account and not for the sake of the different political parties that are forming the coalition. The voters, as we know, have not accepted the Alliance as an ordinary grouping of political parties with the aim of taking over power. On the contrary, people put their faith in the Alliance because of a broader temporary platform, and the people considered President Kiro Gligorov to be the guarantee that this platform would be accomplished. In this sense, little attention was paid to the party affiliation of the candidates in the elections; it was the name "Alliance for Macedonia" that counted. The voters voted for the candidates of the Alliance, regardless of whether they were members of the SDSM, the LP, or the SP [Socialist Party]. The arrangement of the forces on the candidate list led to the election results, according to which e parliament was formed.

Nevertheless, the seemingly easy election victory and the triumph accompanied by unprecedented euphoria soon revealed the weaknesses in the Alliance. The Social Democrats were blamed for acting the boss in the house from the outset, telling the others that everything would be democratic if they submitted to them. From the outset the Liberals had the wrong idea about their rating and reputation. They overestimated their real positions and made mistakes that are unpardonable in a coalition. They did not vote for the election of the government and transformed their ministers into experts and politicians of the Liberal Party who are participating, together with the other partners, in the formation of the government. Not unexpectedly, this had an unfavorable impact on the functioning of the government.

Furthermore, matters became even tenser when the Liberals acted as the opposition and not as participants in power when some affairs were imputed to the Alliance for Macedonia. The Liberals rejected responsibility for the "Hard Rock" affair [a demolished discotheque] and they used the event to score party points. They dissociated themselves publicly and refused to share responsibility for the affair with their partners. The Social

Democrats struck back by postponing and by ignoring them in the division of the budget. There were daily imputations, gossip, harsh statements and interviews, articles in one's own party press and the engagement of journalists in the other media, underground battles for acquiring new positions, and so on.

This was the situation until the day of the assassination attempt against President Kiro Gligorov, when the Liberals, lacking any political taste or feelings, issued a public statement in which they overemphasized their leaders' role in normalizing the situation in the state after the attempted assassination: As if the state would have collapsed had it not been for them. We are all witnesses of the mentioned normalization. The Liberals' announcement was immediately followed by a series of interviews and articles by the protagonists in the conflict, after which the question about the collapse of the coalition was raised for the first time. The Liberals strongly criticized the investigation that followed the assassination attempt, directly attacking Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski. Insinuations were also made that inevitably led to the conclusion that the Liberals had something to do with the assassination attempt.

Attempt for Isolation

Instead of dealing seriously with the criminal and terrorist act against the president in all its aspects, and instead of rising to the unprecedented challenge so as to reach the appropriate conclusions about the purpose behind the shooting of the state president, about the motives for physically and politically eliminating him, the two parties continued their mutual recriminations.

Just when President Gligorov resumed his presidential duties and when the general public was greatly relieved and optimistic that successes would continue to be achieved on the international plane in 1996 in which Macedonia and its independence would be reinforced, after the President's first interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA in which he said that the same policy would continue and that a change in the name of Macedonia would not be allowed, when he announced the long-awaited turnaround in the economy, and when the citizens of Macedonia began to believe that this year would be dedicated to their standard of living and to conditions for a better life, the Social Democrats and the Liberals embarked on their final battle, forgetting all the bonds that make a policy or authority successful or unsuccessful.

It must be said that part of the public received the SDSM's rejection of the president's appeal to overcome mutual confrontations as an attempt to isolate him politically. It seemed that at that moment the Social Democrats had ignored President Gligorov's advice, probably considering that his role was historical and that it would be advisable to leave him outside interparty solutions and decisions.

As far as the Liberals are concerned, they hastened to give President Gligorov their support. In doing so they made people believe that the president was on their side and that there was an attempt to involve the president in interparty disputes and transform him into an arbitrator; this would certainly damage his authority and reputation, and would then be used by the opposition to discredit him. Other political parties misuse President Gligorov's name as well, with the aim of lowering his reputation and authority.

Regardless of the latest events, President Gligorov is a politician and a figure that enjoys the highest rating in the country and the greatest respect among the citizens in Macedonia and abroad.

As a personality and statesman, he has an outstanding international reputation and he pays great attention to the relations and stability in the Balkans. He is the architect of the state's foreign and domestic policy, a man who is fulfilling the historic aspirations for the formation of an independent Macedonian state. Every domestic attempt to weaken his position will be made at one's own expense and at the expense of the Republic of Macedonia, and runs the risk of creating serious political turmoil and destabilization. This is quite clear. After Gligorov's second address in the same week it was clear that he would not accept such a role as the British queen's or the protocol function of simply receiving people. On the contrary, he has firmly declared his constitutional position and his respect for the problems and difficulties of the citizens, accepting and affirming the good ideas of both the ruling parties and the opposition. This makes all the citizens, regardless of political affiliation, accept him as their own president. It is impossible to be deprived of his public contemplations about the domestic political situation, the economic situation, relations with our neighbors, and our foreign policy from the aspect of the platform that he has supported and promised to implement regardless of the situation in the Alliance. Honestly speaking, because of his attempts to protect the coalition partners, President Gligorov was considered to be their president rather than the president of all citizens.

Lastly, there is something that has often been repeated recently by all the participants in the political turmoil, that is, responsibility for further developments. Some warn that people should show responsibility, others are ready to accept it. If we respect democratic rules, the latter show the only way to prove that their way is right. The first real test will probably come at the local elections scheduled for this year. The voters will show whom they trust. However, the question about the consequences for the overall political position of the state will remain open if some assessments turn out to be wrong or pushed too hard. There is a great risk of finishing a game that has already been won in the third "period." It could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory.

FYROM: Negotiations With Greece To Resume 27 Feb

AU2102213596 Skopje MIC in English 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Trabscribed Text] The next round of Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]-Greek negotiations in New York, with the mediation of Cyrus Vance, is scheduled for the 27th of this month, ambassador Ivan Toshevski, who is included in these negotiations, confirmed.

Ambassador Toshevski will continue talks on the name differences with the Greek negotiator, the permanent Greek representative to the UN, ambassador Hristos Zaharakis.

With article 5 of the Interim Accord, which was signed on September 13th in New York, the two countries are bound to continue the negotiations, with the mediation of the UN, for overcoming the remaining differences.

Poland: Foreign Minister on Integration With NATO, EU

WS2102153796 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 13 Feb 96 p 7

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati by Krzysztof Turowski; place and date not given: "When to the European Union, When to NATO?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Turowski] When it comes to our way to Europe, the Polish Government, unlike those in many West European countries, does not have any problem with its citizens. A majority of Poles approve of Poland's entry into the EU and NATO, but this agreement is not exerting an influence on decisions made by the Western powers.

[Rosati] This agreement, however, makes our task easier. Nevertheless, our entry into European structures remains a very complex problem. Poland's entry into the EU is mainly a question of high costs for both us and the Union. I think, however, that the advantages will outweigh the costs, but convincing our partners about it requires a lot of time. NATO, in turn, is a political problem, related mainly to Russia's position; one should convince Russia that our entry into NATO in no way poses a threat to its vital interests.

[Turowski] Let us continue to talk about the question of our membership in the Union. One hears bold opinions that Poland may find itself in this structure in the year 2000. Meanwhile, skeptics are saying it is not about whether Poland is ready but, rather, about discrepancies within the Union itself, which make its further extension impossible.

[Rosati] Poland wants to be ready for accession into the Union by the year 2000. Moreover, we have many promises from our Western partners on this issue.

[Turowski] Promises are promises, results are nil.

[Rosati] Yes, when we are talking about concrete things, it turns out that it is too early for binding declarations. But you have brought forth the issue of the Union itself. Within the Union, two options collide: the first one—a strong integration supported by Germany and France; the other—a looser association of countries whose main supporters are Great Britain and some Scandinavian countries. Poland is a proponent of the first option. The future of the Union will be decided by an intergovernment conference that begins next month. We cherish the hope here that this conference, which is to last for a year, will determine the scope and pace of extending the Union eastwards.

[Turowski] During President Kwasniewski's and your visit to Germany, Minister Klaus Kinkel assured you that half a year after the intergovernment conference is concluded, negotiations concerning Poland's accession to the Union would start. Is this satisfactory to Poland?

[Rosati] The summit settlements in Madrid, which Minister Kinkel confirmed, are the next step in the process of bringing Poland closer to the Union. But it is still unknown how long the negotiations will be conducted. So, we are trying to determine their commencement and also an approximate date of their conclusion.

Since you mentioned Germany, we feel that Germany is the most ardent supporter of the Polish cause. We know, of course, that Germany takes its own interest in it, but we understand that and want this German policy to be even more visible.

[Turowski] What interest does Germany have in Poland's joining the EU?

[Rosati] Germany, for many reasons, does not want to be a state separating the Union from the rest of Europe. Around their borders, the Germans would like to have partners incorporated in a common economic and legal system. But this is in our interest, too, because such an arrangement with Germany is a safeguard to our security.

[Turowski] Since we are talking about security, let us come back to the question of Poland's participation in NATO. You said at the beginning that the key to this matter is in the hands of those in the Kremlin. What is Poland going to do then?

[Rosati] The decision about NATO extension has been made.

[Turowski] Yes, but it is bringing back the memories of a diplomatic figure of speech: "We are for it, but..." Such support, but full of doubts, was expressed by Chancellor Kohl at the conference in Munich.

[Rosati] That is true, but it is important to stress the fact that this decision has been made and nobody has the right to veto it. However, there is neither a schedule nor a decision on the sequence of admitting new states. Yet a process of military adaptation is under way. The political aspect of the issue, however, makes Western countries not want the NATO extension to be a source of conflict with Russia.

What are we supposed to do? To convince Russia and Ukraine—although in the case of the latter, it is opposed to a lesser degree—that our entry into NATO is in the interest of Russia. This is not at all absurd because our accession to NATO changes its nature in a substantial and unavoidable manner. From a military-defense pact, it has to transform into a pact focusing on political cooperation. This is also because we, as a new NATO member, do not want a military pact aimed against Russia. Poland's entry into NATO is a safeguard of our security, for both Germany and Russia.

[Turowski] But the Russians do not subscribe to this conviction.

[Rosati] That is true. However, one should stubbornly convey our point of view concerning the change of NATO's nature to the Russians. Moreover, we must be a driving force of enterprises that would trigger cooperation between Russia and NATO. Only in this way can we dispel the Russians' mistrust. "Partnership for Peace," cooperation in Bosnia are good ideas, heading toward the right direction, but it is too little. I think the chances of war breakng out, even in winter, are getting smaller and smaller, directly proportional to the development of economic and commercial contacts.

[Turowski] In this context, a question referring to the Oleksy case. In the beginning it did not receive extensive publicity, but, when the military prosecutor's office decided to launch an investigation, there were voices that Russian intelligence is trying to destabilize East European countries.

[Rosati] These are mere press speculations, although the Oleksy case is detrimental to the image of Poland and one should not conceal it. I do not see, however, that the case has impaired the relations between Poland and West European countries. Obviously, all such speculations are subject to analysis in both Warsaw and Washington and in other European capitals, but patience prevails: First, we must solve the problem in a clear way, without concealing anything, and, second, the matter is of a limited range and is not evidence that some Polish politicians are degenerates.

Poland: Russian Official on Poland's NATO Membership

WS2202122496 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 16 Feb 96 p 8

[Interview with Professor Sergey Karaganov, a member of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Council and a participant in the Polish-Russian Round Table conference in Warsaw, by Antoni Zambrowski; date not given: "Poland to NATO—Not Without Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zambrowski] Do you know that the greatest obstacle to improving the Poles' attitude toward Russia is the Chechen war?

[Karaganov] I am aware of the bad reception the war is given by Poles, and not only by them. But it is unpopular also in Russia.

[Zambrowski] You belong to the governing elite in Russia and still you are critical of the war?

[Karaganov] Absolutely. I consider unleashing it to have been a serious mistake. Now nobody knows how to move out of that.

[Zambrowski] Can Russia give the Chechen people an opportunity to solve their problems on their own?

[Karaganov] It is not that simple. Not many states would allow for secession of part of their territory, especially one obtained through the use of violence. Chechnya is surrounded by Russian territories and is closely connected to them. It is possible to stop the war, but that will not solve the problems. Afghanistan is proof that withdrawal of an army does not bring an end to war. In places where there are no more Soviet troops, bloodshed continues.

[Zambrowski] The Soviet aggression disturbed the ethnic balance in Afghanistan, and now Tajiks are fighting to gain the upper hand over the former governors of Afghanistan—Pushtoons.

[Karaganov] A similar thing would happen after withdrawal of our troops from Chechnya. Fighting would be carried over from there to the neighboring territories that belong to Russia.

[Zambrowski] Would it not be possible to withdraw the Russian troops to the north, to Kuban and the Stavropol region, and let the Chechens settle their own accounts?

[Karaganov] The problem is that we have Dagestan and Ossetia just next to that area, and they do not want to take part in the war. We do not know what would happen after a withdrawal of the federal units. I think that sooner or later the army will have to be withdrawn, but for the time being there is no vision of how to do this.

[Zambrowski] Poles are deeply concerned about Chechen matters. When Russia states that this is its internal affair, it quickly reminds us of the times when Poland was an internal affair of Russia.

[Karaganov] That is understandable; such was the history of our nations.

[Zambrowski] Could you tell us why, during the sessions of the Polish-Russian Round Table conference, you argued that Poland's membership in NATO does not agree with the interests of Russia?

[Karaganov] We were not trying to convince anyone about what is convenient for Russia. We explained our stance on the question of NATO, and the Polish side explained its own stance. No one was trying to convince anybody because it is well known that our interests here are divergent.

[Zambrowski] Could you tell us, nonetheless, why Russia does not want Poland to be a member of NATO? After all, NATO is not threatening Russia.

[Karaganov] This is not about Russia's standing against Poland's membership in NATO. Russia is against broadening the North Atlantic Pact. We are apprehensive of the psychological reaction of a large portion of the society because a broadening of NATO will be perceived as an act of animosity and disregard of the interests of Russia. Unfortunately, strong resentment of NATO remains among us as part of the Cold War inheritance. Anyway, NATO is not perceived as an alliance friendly toward Russia. This is exactly why Russian liberals and advocates of [Russian] cooperation with the West are definite opponents of a broadening of the North Atlantic Pact, while communists and supporters of Zhirinovskiy—openly or covertly—enjoy the prospect of an enlarged NATO. They know that this strengthens their position.

[Zambrowski] Just because of the resentment of NATO?

[Karaganov] Just because this will be received as an act of injustice toward Russia, one that would cause its humiliation, and disregard of its interests. For the elites of the government, this would mean an act of disloyalty and breaking a promise. When the unification of Germany was being negotiated, we were being solemnly assured that a broadening of NATO to the East would be out of the question. When signing international agreements with countries of Central and East Europe, we insisted upon the introduction of clauses that would exclude entering alliances aimed against one of the signing parties. Then it was being explained to us that we should not insist on such reservations because it was membership in the European Union and not in NATO that was being contemplated. We agreed to that and, possibly, our trust has been misused.

A broadening of NATO would bring about other crises. The Baltic states will also be willing to join NATO, then Ukraine. The growth of animosity toward NATO will facilitate inclinations toward making such moves as strengthening the military structure of CIS. This does not fall within our interests.

[Zambrowski] Do you mean to tell us that Russia is not interested in a strengthening of the military structures within CIS?

[Karaganov] This would be connected with a number of unfavorable consequences. We cannot let Russia become a state not interested in preserving the European status quo. If this happened, Russia would slide into the position of territorial revisionism, which could be dangerous for both Europe and Russia itself. I would like to avoid this, both as a Russian and a European. Besides, Russia wants to be a key member state of the universal European system of security. A broadening of NATO would mean leaving Russia out of that system; this would mean that the European system is being created, but without us. This is not in our interest.

We understand and respect the Poles' aspirations. Unfortunately, our interests are contradictory to that.

[Zambrowski] Countries that are aiming to become members of the North Atlantic Pact are not doing this because NATO provides more beautiful military uniforms. This is about the fear of Russia.

[Karaganov] Up to this time, everyone has been telling us that the aspirations do not result from fear of Russia but from the desire to belong to Europe. Officially, there are no misgivings about Russia because admitting to this fear means that NATO would be constructed against Russia.

[Zambrowski] I have not said that NATO is against Russia.

[Karaganov] I have caught you on a hasty word. But there is nothing terrible about it apart from that it provides an argument in support of my stance.

[Zambrowski] I am not a diplomat and I am concerned with the truth. It is true that NATO can be protection against the postimperialist claims of Russia.

[Karaganov] I agree, but it is possible to make an agreement that at the moment Russia undertakes some aggressive moves, the endangered states will join NATO. I would approve of that. This would be a restraining factor for Russian polititians.

[Zambrowski] That could be too late. After all, joining NATO is about defense guarantees. Without membership we can expect that NATO could behave in the way the Western countries did in Munich with respect to Czechoslovakia. Or it could wait with help for too long, as it did in the case of Bosnia.

[Karaganov] We could discuss this subject for a long time. I am stating things in an honest way: Russia is not interested in a broadening of NATO without Russia. That is why it is necessary to accept Russia into NATO, as well. Then, we will give our agreement to accepting the other states to the North Atlantic Pact. We do not want to leave Russia out.

Poland: Commission Views Report on Army by U.S. Experts

LD2102140596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm National Defense Commission has decided that the implications of the report on our Army prepared by U.S. experts are generally favorable. However, the deputies have admitted that the report also contains critical elements. Stanislaw Prygon reports:

[Prygon] The report, which was produced by two recognized experts from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, concerns the state of assets and equipment in the Polish Army [WP]. It mentions, among other things, the good military infrastructure, which is designed, however, for peaceful use rather than wartime operations.

The two U.S. specialists have also drawn attention to a relatively high number of officers in relation to the number of soldiers. In the opinion of the commission members, those and other remarks have resulted in unfavorable press comments.

National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, who was present at the commission meeting, questioned the information value of the report. In his opinion, the authors of the report based their comments only on a ministry brochure, and, consequently, this report is of a rather simplistic nature.

Jerzy Milewski, who has been connected with the Ministry of National Defense [as deputy defense minister] in recent years, said that the problem was that U.S. politicians made their judgments and decisions on the basis of such reports.

A motion was submitted at the commission meeting suggesting that the ministry should prepare its own report on the state of the Polish Army. Stanislaw Prygon, speaking from the Sejm for Polish Radio First Program.

Poland: Lack of Response to U.S. Report on NATO

LD2102202496 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Passages in quotation marks recorded—relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm Defense Commission has held an emergency meeting to discuss the issue of a U.S. report on Poland's preparations for NATO membership. National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski described the lack of response to the report by Polish officials as a minor mistake. He also announced that there would not be any consequences for the officials who had ignored the draft of the report.

[Correspondent Bogdan Ulka] The deputies, in common with representatives of the National Defense Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Department, and the National Security Bureau, decided that the tenor of the report by the U.S. Congress research office is beneficial for Poland. Controversies were caused by several sentences in the report that concerned the arguments about civilian control of the military and the lack of ability in the military to make independent decisions. National Security Bureau head Jerzy Milewski included among the negative features of the report a sentence about the military being permeated by communist political officers. Minister Dobrzanski explained that this applied to the pre-1989 situation.

Deputies criticized the Defense Ministry for failing to respond to a U.S. request for comments on the report.

[National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski] "I cannot really explain this right now. It seems to me that the reason was that they had generally agreed with the contents of the report."

[Ulka] The deputies decided that an answer should have been given to the U.S. experts' request inasmuch as the report fashions the views of congressmen who are going to have an influence on Poland's membership in NATO.

[Sejm Defense Commission Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski] "If in this simple case the Foreign Affairs Ministry had also had a report, I believe a note would have been sent to the next desk up saying: Gentlemen, the deadline has run out or is running out. There is nothing wrong with inviting two people for coffee and telling them about three aspects, not about any secrets but about three aspects."

[Ulka] According to Tomasz Nalecz of the Union of Labor, the report shows that conflicts within the defense departments are watched by our Western partners and could influence the decision to expand NATO.

Poland: Cimoszewicz's Political Career, Background

96EP0031A Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 8 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Anita Gargas under the rubric "Who's Who": "Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz: A Decidedly Red Visage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 1 February, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz was designated for the post of head of government. The press published articles showing him to be a man independent of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], not only because he is "unaffiliated with any party, but because in the past he has repeatedly strayed from the party line." Yet the vita of the new prime minister exemplifies a typically communist career.

He was born on 13 September 1950 in Warsaw. His father, Colonel Marian Cimoszewicz, served in Military Intelligence. According to military documents, in the years 1945-46 he "participated in liquidating the underground."

Starting in 1968, the young Cimoszewicz studied law at the University of Warsaw. He became chairman of the intramural branch of the ZMS [Union of Socialist Youth] and subsequently of the SZSP [Socialist Union of Polish University Students]. Three years later he joined the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]. He became a member of the party's University Committee, and later its secretary.

In 1972 he began to work at the Institute of International Law at the University of Warsaw. At the same time he got married. His wife, Barbara Aponowicz, recalls, "We were lucky: we were immediately allotted part of a dwelling in Sadyba."

In 1977 Cimoszewicz departed for an internship with the United Nations in Geneva. He defended his doctoral dissertation on customs preferences of Third World Countries.

In 1980 he was granted a Fullbright scholarship at Columbia University in New York. According to the information contained in the so-called Macierewicz List, before his departure he was recruited by PRL [Polish People's Republic] intelligence. Section II, Department I of the Ministry of Interior Affairs registered him on 25 September 1980 as a secret employee bearing the pseudonym "Carex." In June 1992, after Sejm passed the "lustration" resolution [vetting of communists], Cimoszewicz published an open letter in which he declared, "In 1980 a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked me to assist the Polish diplomatic service during my sojourn in the United States. But actual cooperation never came to pass."

In the States Cimoszewicz was a member of the party cell attached to a PRL consulate. He returned to Poland in 1982.

Three years later he moved with his family to the village of Kalinowka Koscielna, Bialystok Voivodship, where he took over a 20-hectare farm left by his wife's parents and was agricultural secretary of the local township.

In 1989 he was a PZPR candidate for elections to the "Contract Sejm." He also was a delegate to the very last PZPR congress. On 29 January 1990 he declared, "Rakowski undertook a task equal to that of an illusionist and magician in turning 1,600 PZPR delegates into social democrats.... Few find this credible. I took no part in the deliberations of the founding congress of the new party, because I thought this project would be a merely cosmetic change in the nature of the old party." He became unaffiliated with any party. At the same time he co-initiated the founding of the Parliamentary Caucus of the Democratic Left, which averted the dispersal of communists following the disbanding of the PZPR. He chaired that caucus until the end of the Sejm term.

In May, that is, when the SdRP had obtained funds on loan from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, during a debate of the law on political parties, Cimoszewicz objected to their foreign financing. "I'm surprised at my colleagues from the OKP (Citizens' Parliamentary Club) who speak so much in favor of Polish national sovereignty yet favor receiving foreign funding for their party." He was a candidate in the first presidential elections (winning 1.5 million votes).

He was active in civic affairs in Bialystok Voivodship, where he had won a Sejm deputy's seat, bolstering the communist—including Belarusian—*nomenklatura*. On 21 December 1990 he disclosed in Sejm an internal MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] assessment study of Polish-Belarusian relations. His disclosure was characterized by OKP deputies as "sowing discord between the Polish and Belarusian nations" and "echoing the joint operations of the Communist Party of Poland and the Communist Party of West Belarus," etc.

In 1991 he was reelected to the parliament. On the one hand he proposed that Miller should not swear the deputy's oath until the affair of "Moscow money" was cleared up, but on the other he wrote in TRYBUNA, "The camp in power has begun to fear elections. Only this can explain the upsurge of hubbub about decommunization and the brutal attacks, lies, and insinuations directed against the Left."

Soon he began to work on establishing his own newspaper. He founded the Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Company Publishing House, and in April 1992 he published the first issue of GAZETA TYGODNIOWA, distributed in northeastern Poland. Among others, Danuta Waniek and Wieslawa Ziolkowska worked for that newspaper.

After the "Macierewicz List" appeared, Cimoszewicz became a fierce opponent of decommunization and lustration.

"These days, rumors about a decommunization law being drafted are resurfacing. That law is not only to ban former PZPR members from employment in the government, the judiciary, and the banks, but also to prevent them from competing in elections to the parliament and local governments," Cimoszewicz lied in TRYBUNA in July 1992, following the formation of the Suchocka government. "The authors of this notion are aware of the evident conflict between such a law and the constitution, and the international obligations of Poland in, among other places, the Council of Europe.... The escalation of fear is continuing."

As a member of the Legal and Rights of Man committees of the National Assembly of the Council of Europe, Cimoszewicz depicted decommunization and lustration, to westerners, as activities that are harmful and that violate the rights of man. In January 1993 he transmitted to Worms, a French deputy to the Council of Europe, copies of drafts of lustration and decommunization laws which the European Parliament, in Cimoszewicz's opinion, "deemed conflicting with the political rights of man, since they violate the principle of nondiscrimination, the principle of universal access to public service, and the principle of free elections." Half a year later it turned out that Cimoszewicz "accidentally" become a report presenter for the Committee for Decommunization in Central and Eastern Europe. Following protests in Poland (especially from the Center Accord party) six of the 12 Polish delegates to the Assembly of the Council of Europe submitted an official protest to the Assembly chairman. One Polish delegate, Aleksander Malachowski, had, however, sent to the Assembly chairman a letter condemning the initiative of his fellow delegates and terming mendacious the rationale for their protest, which, among other things, offered the reminder that the Democratic Left Alliance originates from the PZPR, and declared that Cimoszewicz is "morally unacceptable" as a presenter of reports on decommunization.

In September 1993 Cimoszewicz was again reelected Sejm deputy. In the Pawlak government, formed after the elections, he held the post of deputy prime minister and minister of justice—attorney general.

It was only two months after taking these three posts that he sold his shares in GAZETA TYGODNIOWA.

In October 1994 he carried out the "Pure Hands" drive, which spared the postcommunists and, apart from presenting to public opinion information on public officials who "double-dipped" or violated the anticorruption law, had no legal consequences.

As attorney general he asked Sejm to waive the immunity of his fellow Sejm caucus member, Ireneusz Sekula, chairman of the GUC (Main Customs Office). At the same time, when asked about the snail's pace at which the Sejm committee was considering the motion, he explained, "This is one of the most complex waivers of immunity cases. The dossiers are so numerous as to total five volumes. I don't believe excessive haste is justified."

In the period when Cimoszewicz was minister of justice, Generals Ciaston and Platek, accused in the Rev. Popieluszko murder trial, were acquitted. The suit against Cimoszewicz for protection of personal rights, filed by former OKP Deputy Jan Beszta-Borowski—whom Cimoszewicz publicly called, among other things, "a dyed-in-the-wool liar" after Beszta-Borowski had disclosed the truth about Col. Marian Cimoszewicz—was dismissed by a court.

Following the early release of Grzegorz Piotrowski (one of the murderers of the Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko), Cimoszewicz lodged an appeal and the criminal was returned to prison.

When he was deputy prime minister, he had an unpleasant experience; while he was enjoying himself at a banquet, his new Mercedes 280E, parked nearby, in which he was chauffeured by a BOR (Personal Security Unit) agent, was stolen. The car was not insured and, according to Detective Krzysztof Rutkowski, "For a long time the BOR was unable to determine the car's color and identification number." Cimoszewicz denied that the Mercedes contained any confidential or secret documents.

Following the formation of the Oleksy government he became a Sejm vice speaker. Although initially he was opposed to the SLD's [Democratic Left Alliance] candidacy in the presidential elections, he became the head of the Kwasniewski campaign committee. Before the elections, last September, he published, jointly with Adam Michnik, the article, "On Truth and Conciliation," in which they proposed the formation of "...a group consisting of persons who enjoy the confidence of the public, which would prepare its own report on truth and conciliation. They should attempt a joint appraisal of our recent history."

Last December he took over the post of chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly, after Kwasniewski.

He is founder of the "Poland in Europe" Foundation for Public Initiatives. In 1993 he founded, together with Barbara Labuda, the Association for Rights and Liberties.

Poland: Former President Walesa Interviewed

WS2102154396 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 1 Feb 96 p 4

[Interview with Lech Walesa, former president of the Polish Republic, by Darius Szreter; place and date not given: "I Am a Man of Realistic Solutions"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Szreter] You have become a Solidarity adviser, you have two rooms and a secretary; where is the court of former coworkers and friends?

[Walesa] Not all people are suitable to perform every job. External conditions do not allow for accommodating even the people who used to cooperate with me. Many of them live in Warsaw, anyway.

[Szreter] During your presidency, you dealt with five prime ministers. How do you size them up?

[Walesa] I am far from scoring people on the 1 to 10 scale. I must work with anybody who is at hand and agrees to work with me. I must because I have no choice. Some were better, and some were worse. But the circumstances have changed. They were different when the first prime minister took office and different with the fifth one. It should be left to historians to assess it—I am heading forward.

[Szreter] But you did have a personal relationship with each of them? For instance, you did not like Oleksy from the very start, and you picked on him on every occasion that arose.

[Walesa] No, on the contrary. I have to say this. I liked Oleksy from the start. He got on my bad side just before he became prime minister. He came up with quite a good declaration of loyalty. Almost down on his knees, he would tell me how good he would be, that he would never cause any harm to me, how faithfully he would serve me. I felt foolish because my wife had never come up with anything like that to make me marry her. And then, whenever he encountered journalists, he would talk to the effect that I had striven after him. He behaved similarly on a number of occasions, even in small matters, somehow in a mentorial manner. He had the nature of a schoolteacher—he always wanted to pontificate. And it turned me against him, but in the beginning I liked him.

[Szreter] But you did not think he was an agent?

[Walesa] I will put it in some other way. I see this problem differently. We were in captivity, we lacked sovereignty. We had broad cooperation with the Soviets. Boy scouts of the two countries befriended each other, they were in touch; and even cities were making friends, as Gdansk and Leningrad. The cooperation was of a social nature, but sometimes it was used for evil purposes—harassing, hampering, and spying on people. Now the nation is free, we have canceled our subscription to this, and it makes us determine social and political attitudes toward these issues.

[Szreter] Will you come back to the shipyard? It is somehow difficult to imagine such a situation. Will security operatives be driving you to your workshop in an official car?

[Walesa] I want to emphasize some aspects stemming from the slogan "Back to the shipyard." First, the state, the system that we have built does not know what to do with the former president. Is he to be a cloakroom clerk or a bartender? A country of 40 million people must tackle this problem. Second, if this problem is not legally resolved, then I, according to the rules, have no choice. I was a shipyard delegate to the union, and from the union to the president's job. I want to adhere to the principles, I must repeat that, because otherwise I would be called a smart-aleck. Obviously, I have a lot of proposals, even from the shipyard management, to be a consultant for big bucks. But I cannot be a consultant because what would my former colleagues say? That I have deserted them, that I am ashamed of them, or that I loathe them? I like the work I used to do. Or if I did not want to be a part of political life and wanted to be an ordinary electrician? I can! You are right. It does not become the president to be an electrician, but, for the time being, this issue has not been resolved, and if I want to stick to the rules, then, in fact, I have no choice. I must come back. [passage omitted]

[Szreter] You have a bodyguard for life. Do you think your life is threatened?

[Walesa] There are certain principles, and this principle provides that the president is entitled to a bodyguard, a driver, and a car.

[Szreter] Have there been any threats?

[Walesa] I am scared of only God. I am not afraid of threats. I cannot accept them.

[Szreter] You often said that, if the state of affairs is bad, one should not worry about it because it only means it can get better. Is the state of affairs bad now?

[Walesa] It depends. If one should look at it from the point of view of how many rooms I have where I work, then the state of affairs is bad because they are smaller. On the other hand, I do not have to do many things I do not like: give speeches, get up early to go to work.

[Szreter] But it could be better. How does Lech Walesa envisage changes for the better? What would you like to accomplish?

[Walesa] I can tell you right now: I have done a very good job. Nobody has done more than I have when it comes to foreign debt remission; nobody has done more to make the Soviet Armed Forces withdraw, the Warsaw Pact dissolve, and so on, and so forth. Those are the most important things; I could enumerate endlessly the less important ones. Ten years ago if somebody had told me that this could be done, I would have sacrificed all my life to do one of those things. One is not supposed to mention it. I follow the rule: Let the right hand not see when the left one is giving. Yet sometimes, in Western democracies, one should boast of what has been done. I did not do that. I did not boast. Right now, I will have to remind the people of certain things.

[Szreter] Would you like to tackle these problems once again as president?

[Walesa] Yes and no. I miss some aspects of the job. I even miss the commuting by train or car. I like traveling fast; I like planes and I will miss that. I hate wasting my time commuting. But I do not like other presidential problems. If there were a presidential system and the Polish problems remained unsolved as they are now, I would like to be president to solve them. I would not necessarily have to be president. Somebody else could be president, and I could prompt him and he could solve the problems better. What I always cared for was not the position but the problem. They can be solved from different angles. Now I have even greater opportunities than in those days, when I had to waste my time on different diplomatic affairs, which, though nice and pleasant, take time and which I do not like because I am a man of realistic solutions.

Poland: Poll: Trust in Kuron, Coalition Politicians

WS2102135196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by "KNYSZ": "CBOS Poll; Poles Trust the Left"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Coalition politicians are winning increasingly more public confidence; support for new Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz has risen the most.

Since Cimoszewicz assumed the post of prime minister, he has gained more supporters: From January to February, confidence in him rose from 44 percent to 57 percent. As a result, he is now ranked fifth among the politicians whom we trust the most.

In general, coalition politicians are doing better and better. There are as many as five of them among the first 10 most trusted politicians. In addition, three politicians among the remaining five are people with leftist views (Spokesman for Civil Rights Tadeusz Zielinski, Jacek Kuron, and Aleksander Malachowski). The broadly understood right wing is represented by two such different politicians as [Freedom Union Chairman] Leszek Balcerowicz and Jan Olszewski [chairman of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland].

In the period when Cimoszewicz became more trustworthy in the eyes of the people, there were also other politicians whose position improved: Senate Speaker Adam Struzik (by 6 percent), as well as Deputy Sejm Speaker Marek Borowski and Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych (by 5 percent each). The gap between Speaker Zych (public confidence in him is steadily growing) and Jacek Kuron, who is at the top of the most-trusted politicians' list, is only 5 percent. Trust in the latter decreased from 82 percent to 79 percent.

The position of former Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy did not change; he is ranked 11th, having gained the confidence of 46 percent of the respondents. It is worth recalling that, between December and January, when suspicions of Oleksy's cooperation with a foreign intelligence service appeared, confidence in him slumped by 15 percent—from 61 percent to 46 percent.

The only politician of the Democratic Left Alliance who lost public confidence is Jerzy Jaskiernia, former justice minister and prosecutor general in the Oleksy cabinet; this month he is the person who is at the top of the black list of politicians whom we do not trust (45 percent do not trust him). Jaskiernia got ahead of former President Lech Walesa (40 percent) and Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (39 percent), who until now were traditionally at the top of the black list.

As for opposition politicians, three of them gained in the eyes of the respondents: Freedom Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz (from 43 percent to 47 percent, and public confidence in him has been steadily growing since last fall), Adam Strzembosz (from 38 percent to 40 percent), and Walesa (from 42 percent to 44 percent).

Whom We Trust

	Percent
Jacek Kuron	79
Jozef Zych	74
Aleksander Kwasniewski	68
Tadeusz Zielinski	62
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz	57

	Percent
Grzegorz Kolodko	55
Aleksander Malachowski	53
Waldemar Pawlak	51
Jan Olszewski	48
Leszek Balcerowicz	47

The poll was conducted between 2 and 6 February on a random representative sample of 1,205 adult Poles.

Poland: Kwasniewski Approves New Labor Law

LD2102231696 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Aleksander Kwasniewski has signed the new Labor Code, which amends the provisions of the labor law from more than 20 years ago. The new act introduces more than 200 amendments, compared with the old code. These, among other things, concern the principles of employing and dismissing employees, the duration of holidays, and working hours.

[Correspondent Wojciech Nomejko] Work on the act went on for more than two years. It began with lawyers preparing the assumptions of the document. Next, the labor department drew up the bill, then there were consultations, and, finally, parliament passed the document. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Malgorzata Zietkiewicz] The new code is to come into effect three months after its publication in the Legislative Journal. There are provisions for some exceptions from this principle. Some of the regulations will come into effect much later than three months and some others not until next January.

One of the new elements in the act is that the existing differentiation between private and state work enterprises will disappear. According to the legislators, this is to force the heads of small companies to apply the code, while the Labor Ministry is hoping it will eradicate the savage capitalism in the private sector, especially employment under commissioning agreements.

The main changes apply to five areas: employment, dismissal, holidays, working time, and retirement.

Employment: What is changed here is that the employer, under the threat of a fine, is obliged to sign with the employee an agreement not later than seven days after the latter starts work. The third consecutive agreement for a specific period automatically becomes an agreement for an indefinite period, provided there had been no break of more than one month between the agreements.

Dismissal: The period of notice under agreements for an indefinite period depends on the length of service. After six months [as heard], the notice is two weeks. It is one month where the length of service exceeds six months, and three months after three years of employment.

Leave will also change. After six months of employment, rather than a year as at present, there will be entitlement to leave. Minimum leave will be 18 rather than 14 days. Free Saturdays do not count in leave.

There will be more free Saturdays but only by one: 39 instead of 38. There will be extra pay for night work, amounting to 20 percent of the minimum national wage.

Pensions: Old-age and disability pension severance allowance will apply to every employee, rather than to just some groups. It will amount to one month's pay. This is a negative change. For instance, in the health sector until now, this had been three months' pay. But the new code lays down the so-called minimal norms—that is, solutions adopted by particular industries cannot be worse, but they can be better should the employees negotiate this with the employer.

Poland: Enfranchisement Referendum Results Analyzed

WS2202153996

[FBIS Report] On 22 February, two major Warsaw vernacular dailies carry two articles and a commentary on the mass enfranchisement referendum held last Sunday, 18 February.

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist daily widely read in government circles, on page two publishes a 650-word article by Piotr Adamowicz and Pawel Reszka entitled "Solidarity After the Referendum; Turning Failure Into an Advantage." The authors claim that the referendum has caused a split among the union's leaders, some of whom "want to join forces with other parties to have enfranchisement laws passed by the Sejm," while others claim it is more important to "form a wide coalition before next year's parliamentary elections." "None of the unionists," states the report, "admit that the referendum was a failure for Solidarity." The article goes on to point out that "enfranchisement was a key element of the Solidarity platform." Adamowicz and Reszka remind readers that "the union concentrated all of its efforts on the campaign preceding the enfranchisement referendum. Unofficial sources claim that the National Commission alone spent approximately 300,000 zlotys on the campaign and analyses prepared by experts." The union will "find it most difficult to come to terms with the 32-percent turnout." "Under the circumstances," the report continues, "Solidarity has come forth with an alternative plan for implementing mass enfranchisement. The union will try to establish the broadest possible platform agreement. It could include all existing groups except the Democratic Left Alliance."

However, the authors are skeptical about the project: "There is the question of whether experts from the Freedom Union [UW] are capable of elaborating a privatization law together with experts from the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and whether politicians from the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] are willing to cooperate with the UW or the Union of Labor. One must also remember that the UW, the most powerful parliamentary opposition group, has a completely different view on the National Investment Funds [NFI's] than any other potential member of such an alliance." Jacek Smagiewicz, a Solidarity leader, "does not hide the fact that the union is counting on support from the PSL in the course of a Sejm vote on draft laws making enfranchisement possible and providing a legal framework for earmarking part of the money generated by enfranchisement for old-age pensions." Another Solidarity leader told RZECZPOSPOLITA that "it is far more important to consolidate the opposition in order to succeed in the parliamentary elections. Once we gain a majority, we can think about enfranchisement more realistically."

The same daily on page two carries another 350-word article signed by "K.O." entitled "UW on the Referendum; To Ask Understandable Questions." UW Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz and Janusz Lewandowski, one of the party's leaders, are quoted as saying: "Last Sunday's enfranchisement referendum has clearly shown that this democratic tool should not be employed to solve economic problems that people find ambiguous and difficult to understand." Balcerowicz outlined three major problems facing the government at present: "compensation for pensioners and employees of the public sector, reprivatization, and combining the reform of the social security system with further privatization." Janusz Lewandowski said that "the vote held on Sunday was political; people often cast their votes without thinking. Yet people vote practically every day by picking up their [NFI] shareholder certificates." Balcerowicz added: "Seven million people have already taken part in the NFI project, which indicates that it is gaining support." The report claims that "in its assessment of the referendum, UW concluded that no one is against having various forms of privatization from which each company could choose the one it considers best."

GAZETA WYBORCZA, a center-left daily, on page four carries an analysis by Agnieszka Kublik under the title "The Referendum Has Confirmed the Right's Existence; Strong and Helpless." The author states that "the referendum questions were very difficult, and the average Pole found it tough to imagine the practical implications of his answers. Thus, people voted as they were instructed to by political parties." "The vote was political," the commentary continues, "that is to say, the answers provided depended directly on the political preferences of those taking part." Kublik reminds us that "the parties that appealed for voting four times 'yes' and one time 'no' (on the question about the NFI's) were Solidarity, ROP, the Christian-National Union, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Movement for the Republic, the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, and the Movement of 100. The referendum results clearly show that more than 8 million adult Poles listened to those parties."

The article points out that "this is slightly more than the number of votes Lech Walesa received in the first round of the 1990 presidential elections, when 6.6 million Poles supported him. This is even more than Walesa netted in the first round of the last presidential elections—5.9 million votes. It is slightly less than two post-Solidarity rightist candidates, Lech Walesa and Jan Olszewski, jointly received—7.1 million votes." According to the author, "these figures show that the rightist post-Solidarity electorate has evidently grown over the past six years by some 1.5-2 million." The commentary concludes: "The referendum was a political failure for the right. Yet, at the same time, it has demonstrated how strong and disciplined the rightist electorate is and how recklessly that strength and discipline are being wasted."

Romania: Iraqi Military Security Head Allegedly Visits

AU2202092196 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 15 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by S.R. Ica: "On the Personal Invitation of C.V. Tudor and the PRM, an Influential Iraqi Personality Briefly Visited Romania"—all Iraqi names as published]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some time ago, at the PRM's [Greater Romania Party] invitation, and, personally, at C.V. Tudor's [PRM president] invitation, a group of "distinguished" high-ranking Iraqi personalities arrived in Romania.

The importance of the visit—which passed almost unnoticed—cannot be either denied or minimized. The person who best emphasized its importance was the Iraqi Ambassador Ibrahim Sultan himself who, in press statements and interviews, gratefully thanked C.V. Tudor for the accomplishment of this visit and the brotherly support offered to the embargo-hit Iraq, as well as its providential president, "the great" Saddam Husayn. In other words, the visit was part of the efforts made by the country, which is a friend of the PRM as well as C.V. Tudor, to break the U.S. embargo following the affair with their nuclear plant and Saddam's unsuspected program to offer an anti-imperialistic nuclear shield to protect its nation.

Everything would have been nice and neat, and, above all, also quite natural, had Iraq merely lent a "brotherly hand" to the PRM and to the ROMANIA MARE weekly run by presidential candidate C.V. Tudor. There is, however, sincerely speaking, one little problem: according to certain well-informed sources, it seems that one of the members of the delegation was a personality whose identity is worth all our attention. He is the man, who a short while ago has become the new "boss" of the Iraqi military security forces. According to our sources, the person in question is General Hatem al-Habibi, who was appointed director of the military security forces (AL AMN al-ASKARI) in December 1995, replacing Saddam's cousin, Gen. Serbawi Ibrahim al-Hassan, who used to occupy that office in the previous six years.

Gen. al-Habibi is known for the important role he played during the Gulf war. He is to cooperate with the new defense minister, Gen. Sultan Hachem Ahmad, who was appointed to that office in July 1995, replacing Gen. 'Ali Assan al-Majid, another one of Saddam's cousins. In this context, it is also worth noting that Saddam has also reorganized the special security forces (AL AMN al-KHAS), which used to be led by his second son, Kosai. In this way, four important directorates have been integrated within the special security: the military police, domestic intelligence, administration security, as well as the security of ministries and orderkeeping forces. Being directly subordinated to President Saddam, the special security exerts control, among other things, over all the dams in Baghdad; besides this, it has taken over the prerogatives, to a great extent, of other security and intelligence bodies.

Slovenia: SDSS Offers SKD, SLS Electoral Cooperation

AU2102155096 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 20 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by U.M.: "Jansa Offers 'Non-Aggression Pact'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana—The Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDSS] has forwarded a working draft of a cooperation agreement of three political parties at this year's parliamentary elections and after them to the leaderships of the Slovene Peoples' Party [SLS] and the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] for consideration.

The SDSS supposedly came to the conclusion that one must start somewhere and that time was running short. The party is also willing to accept an entirely new text, proposed by any other Slovene spring party, as the basis for negotiations.

The signing of this agreement does not mean the formation of an electoral coalition (this would require joint candidates on the electoral lists), but would mean a non-aggression pact during the election campaign. The signatories are supposed to coordinate the visits of more prominent party officials in municipalities, so that meetings would not be organized on the same day or at the same hour. In the election campaign they also would not criticize the procedures of other parties that were signatories to the agreement. This, of course, does not mean that the parties would have to renounce their previous policies, but would merely avoid any direct rivalry in the political struggle that would be to the detriment of one another.

The parties are supposed to sign the agreement with the intention of forming a powerful association of those democratic parties that emerged in the time of the Slovene spring, which are not the descendants of the former socio-political organizations in the political, legal, or material sense and participate in Slovenia's political life and elections without the assistance of assets acquired during the one-party system. The agreement would bind them to coordinate actions in the elections for the State Chamber, the formation of a joint government in the event of victory, and the appropriate functioning of the legislative and executive authorities.

The post of prime minister-designate would go to the signatory party that won the greatest number of votes, with the remaining places in the legislative and executive authorities going, as a rule, according to the number of votes won. The prime minister and the State Chamber speaker would not come from the same party. The parties would form a government in which the most responsible ministerial posts would be occupied by the most capable people, regardless of the party affiliation of the minister in question.

So what do the SLS and SKD think about the SDSS's offer?

SLS President Marjan Podobnik said that his party was a co-author of the proposal and that it, naturally, supported it. However, he was somewhat surprised, because his party did not separately agree with the SDSS to disclose the document to the public. He also said that the SLS had so far striven for versatile cooperation among the parties of the Slovene spring, primarily so that they could form a joint government after the elections and that in the talks the SLS had also favored the formation of an electoral coalition. As a consensus among all possible partners is needed for the success of the proposal, he hopes that the SKD will also be willing to support the agreement. Without this party, the tactical gains of this agreement are not clear. Namely, the objective is to form the future joint government. When asked how binding such an agreement would be, Podobnik said that the signatures were void in the absence of trust. The SLS is willing to honor the agreement 100 percent; however, it is a little restrained because it does not yet know whether the other two parties are willing to do the same. Podobnik is also somewhat critical of the fact that the agreement is not also open to other Slovene spring parties. "Evidently, views on this differ, although I personally would not underestimate these parties. Regardless of any party's chances of winning seats in parliament, the success of a certain political option also depends on sensitivity in analyzing the political circumstances." The smaller parties have less weight intrinsically, but the SLS president believes that it would be a fatal mistake to ignore them altogether.

SKD President Lojze Peterle did not wish to comment on yesterday's offer, because his party had not yet debated the matter. He is expected to present his opinion to the public today. [passage omitted]

Federal

FRY: Cooperation in Prosecuting War Criminals Promised

LD2102195396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1919 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 21 (TANJUG)—Spokesman for the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia Ivica Dacic said Wednesday Yugoslavia would actively cooperate in persecuting [sic] war criminals on grounds of evidence.

Speaking at a press conference, he said, however, that it was not acceptable that "Yugoslavia's state sovereignty be violated" in the process, since its "courts will try Yugoslav citizens for whom there is evidence that they committed war crimes."

Dacic pointed out that the Dayton peace accord clearly states that all sides are obliged to cooperate with the Hague tribunal for crimes committed in former Yugoslavia in persecuting war criminals.

"The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will actively cooperate with NATO and forces of the international community in implementing the peace accord," Dacic said.

He rejected an initiative by the New Democracy Party, his party's coalition partner, that Yugoslavia join NATO's Partnership for Peace Program.

Dacic said this was "a hasty move of unnecessarily currying favor with the international community, (a move) which does not take adequate care of the sovereignty" of Yugoslavia.

Speaking about preparations for the third congress of his party in Belgrade on March 2, Dacic announced that about 50 parties from abroad had confirmed their representatives would be in attendance.

Dacic pointed out that the essence of the basic congress document was the struggle for a democratic, free, economically affluent society, equality of people, social justice, and the rule of peace and cooperation among peoples and states.

The Socialist Party of Serbia has a total membership of about 500,000, Dacic said.

FRY: TANJUG Reviews Holbrooke's Diplomacy in Bosnia

LD2102150996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1432 GMT 21 Feb 96

[Report by Borislav Lalic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Feb 21 (TANJUG)—Few people, even in Washington, can believe that Richard Holbrooke, whose name is associated with the Dayton peace accords more than anyone else's, is leaving Bosnia and the Balkans.

Nothing was possible there without him.

When he went to Bosnia in early February with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, for the 18th time in a row, he bade farewell to his hosts and journalists, and announced that he would retire from diplomacy on February 21.

A week later, developments showed that he would be forced to go there once again because the Dayton peace was in jeopardy.

In one week of shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb and with permanent telephone contacts with Washington, Holbrooke managed to convene and hold the Rome meeting, which was a sort of new Dayton.

At the end of the Rome talks on Sunday, he once again bade farewell to journalists and participants in the talks. Holbrooke announced that on Feb. 21 he would leave Washington and settle in his hometown New York where he would go into business.

Holbrooke once already retired from diplomacy 15 years ago and went to the Wall Street. At the time, he also held the post of assistant secretary of state, but with a low income for U.S. standards.

In the meantime, he was again appointed assistant secretary of state but still with modest income. However, it was a new Holbrooke this time, not the one of fifteen years ago whose name did not mean much in the United States and even less outside the U.S.

Holbrooke was for a short period his country's ambassador to Germany and was later again named assistant secretary of state. Then Bosnia happened.

The U.S. Administration entrusted this skilled, ambitious and shrewd diplomat with some experience in Europe with the task of resolving the Bosnian conflict. Holbrooke seized the opportunity.

He combined the authority of the United States, the world's only remaining super-power, with his unquestionable talents, and in six months' time his name became an institution. Holbrooke is now a candidate for the Nobel peace prize.

Holbrooke, one of the architects of the Dayton accord, is constantly on front pages of magazines and in primetime shows in the United States, which is not easy to achieve.

Although many praise him as a brilliant diplomat, Holbrooke will leave behind many enemies in Washington, because many dislike him for his immoderate need to be in the limelight and arrogant attitude.

The peace accord was a success and Holbrooke's role was one of a 'manager' in the peace process, but the real protagonists were Serbian President Slobodoan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, U.S. President Bill Clinton and a few others from Europe.

The reasons for his withdrawal, at a time when many think that he is still needed, are best known to him, although they are easy to anticipate.

Holbrooke has understood better than anyone else that he has done the work of his lifetime and that he would not want to spend the rest of his life in the U.S. State Deparment as an assistant secretary of state.

He held the same post two decades ago, and he understood that one should always retire at the right moment, while standing at his highest position.

It is now time to earn big money, which is not at all perceived as vulgar in the United States.

He has in his diplomatic briefcase some precious material—he can write books about the Balkans, Dayton and the relations between Washington, Paris, Bonn and Moscow in the dramatic months of the Balkan conflict.

And the Balkans, who's going to replace him there.

It is still not known in Washington.

Perhaps peace in the Balkans can take root without a new Holbrooke.

FRY: Law, Constitution Guarantee Press Freedom

LD2102214096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2133 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nis, Yugoslavia, Feb. 21 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia's information secretary said on Wednesday that freedom of the press was guaranteed by law and the Yugoslav constitution.

Speaking for the local radio in Nis, southern Serbia, Dragutin Brcin said that Yugoslavia was proud to say that its freedom of the press was on the level with developed democracies.

Freedom of the press does not extend to fomenting ethnic, religious, racial and political hatred, conflicts and intolerance, violence and primitivism, and to violating privacy and dignity of man, said Brcin.

He said that about 2,000 papers were currently being issued in Serbia and that the state made no obstacles to the opening and operation of private radio and television stations.

Brcin said that the minorities too had their own media which operated without interference from the government.

He said that the Albanian and Hungarian minorities had their own newspapers and television stations in their own languages, and added that the Bulgarian, Slovak, Ruthenian and other minorities had their own radio and television programmes too.

Serbia

Serbia: Bosnian Serbs Apply To Return to Sarajevo

AU2102190696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnian refugees living in the municipality of Gornji Milanovac expressed the wish today to return to Serb Sarajevo. Forty families have applied to the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees, expressing the wish to return to Sarajevo in view of the agreement reached in Rome.

Measures have been taken for these refugees to be included in the return, which will be organized at the Serbian level.

The document on Sarajevo that was adopted at the Contact Group meeting in Rome states that all the nations and citizens of Sarajevo will have the same opportunities and there will be no discrimination.

Serbia: Rights Group Urges Probe Into Serb Camps

AU2102174396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sandzak Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedom of Movement has sent letters to the International Committee of Red Cross and the UNHCR saying the following:

A number of sources have reported that a fairly large number of people of Bosniak nationality from Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly from Srebrenica and Zepa, and Bosniaks from Sandzak, who were abducted from a workers' bus in Sjeverin in October 1992 and train number 671 at Strpci station in February 1993, who are citizens of Serbia and Montenegro, are being held in several isolated camps in and around Uzice, Cajetina, and Bajina Basta, in camps in Branicko Polje and Sljivovica and in a tunnel in the border area.

Considering the reaction and the new hope that these reports have generated among the families of these abducted people, we appeal to the human rights organizations and the democratic public to visit these and other locations around Uzice as soon as possible, determine whether these reports are well founded, and inform the public on the real situation, read the letters from the Sandzak Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedom of Movement.

Serbia: Sandzak Muslim on Role of B-H Authorities, SDA

AU2202103696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 17 Feb 96 p 8

[Interview with Sefket Krcic, chairman of the Society of Sandzak Muslims, by Mirsad Fazlic in Sarajevo; date not given: "Autonomy—Our Future"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

[Fazlic] What has been the role of the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the search for a solution to the Sandzak problem so far?

[Krcic] The search for a solution to the huge Sandzak problem has been on the margins of Bosnian policy so far, which has additionally affected the situation in Sandzak. If it is continued with the present policy, the Sandzak Muslims will—under the pressure of the regime—not be able to do anything else but either assimilate or emigrate.

[Fazlic] Do you think that it is possible to achieve a just solution for the Sandzak Muslims under the existing regime in the FRY?

[Krcic] The search for a solution to the Kosovo problem has been intensified now. A new constitution is being prepared. It was leaked to the public that the new constitution will (unofficially) divide the FRY into four republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, and one autonomous region, Sandzak. This would, in my opinion, be the ideal solution for the democratization of the region.

Political Immaturity

[Fazlic] What role has the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] played in the search for a solution to the Sandzak problem so far?

[Krcic] The SDA has not shown political maturity at the level of a democratic party, since it has led the Muslim people into social poverty. When everything was ready for the 1992 elections and when we could have won in seven or eight of 11 communities in Sandzak, we simply broke down, because the SDA did not participate in the elections. The rule was established by the police, and unsupportable repression has prevailed ever since. [passage omitted]

Montenegrins More Liberal

[Fazlic] Have any concrete results been achieved after the contact between Sandzak representatives and Belgrade authorities?

[Krcic] There is a monstrous party in the way of the establishment of better relations between the Muslims and the Serbs in the FRY—the one led by Mira Markovic, Slobodan Milosevic's wife [Yugoslav United Left—JUL]. This party tries to present itself as a representative of the Muslim interests in the FRY. This will bring nothing, and a lot will be lost, so the SDA headquarters and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina should intervene quickly to make the Muslim population of Sandzak unique.

[Fazlic] What is the future of Sandzak and the Sandzak Muslims?

[Krcic] There is no future for us in Sandzak without political autonomy. We are not asking for the borders to be changed or a merger with the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we ask for all our political, cultural, national, democratic, and other rights within the FRY to materialize.

Serbia: Studio B Editor Promises 'Room' to Opposition

AU2102161896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The State Has Taken Over 'Studio B'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—The independent television station "Studio B" ceased to exist in the way we have known it shortly before 1600 yesterday. The program was interrupted at the moment when Milorad Roganovic's statement on the decision of the city authorities to take over the independent station was being broadcast for the second time. Milorad Roganovic is the deposed manager and the editor in chief of independent television Studio B. After a short break, the broadcasting was resumed with music videospots. The television station was taken over on the basis of a decision by the Supreme Court of Serbia on 25 December [1995], which was, according to Roganovic, never sent to Studio B. The Belgrade County Court drew on this decision and removed independent television Studio B from the trade register, with the result that it was restored to the status of a public company. The City Assembly appointed City Assembly Secretary Ljubomir Milic as chairman of the Board of Directors and Dragisa Kovacevic as acting editor in chief, who was hitherto the first man at the "SOS Channel."

After the program had been interrupted, Kovacevic's first move was to appoint new editors and to offer those who had created the radio and television program until that moment the chance to retain their positions. It was proposed that Desa Cavic should become the editor of documentary programs, Vesna Vojvodic the editor of news programs, and Misa Rajkovic the editor of television programs. Zoran Matic, who had previously been the editor in chief was offered the position of an editor. He resigned, however, and announced that he would take a holiday. Milorad Roganovic will also be going on holiday.

Ljubomir Milic, the new chairman of the Board of Directors of independent television Studio B arrived at Studio B at around 1800. At an improvised meeting, he told the employees that there would be "no significant changes either in the personnel or in the programming since it was not the aim of the City Assembly to deprive Belgrade of a channel such as Studio B. The programming should remain like the present one, but the dialogue should be cultivated a little more." Milic promised that salaries would be regularly paid and announced that "the city of Belgrade had enough possibilities to invest into Studio B."

The employees were addressed by the new first man of the station, Dragisa Kovacevic, in the afternoon. "Studio B will not be the public-address system of any party," he said, adding that "the opposition will have more room in the station than hitherto, with the difference that it will be of a better quality." [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Interviewed on Dayton, Serb Control

BR2102143096 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 17-18 Feb 96 p 7

[Report on interview with Kosovo Albanian President Ibrahim Rugova by Morten Jastrup; date, place not given: "President Seeks Office"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ibrahim Rugova is president of a country that does not officially exist. The Albanians of Kosovo (which they themselves call Kosova) have elected him as their head of state, but there is no official state of Kosovo.

In 1989 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic annulled all of Kosovo's autonomy privileges and declared a state of emergency in the area. The Albanians call this an occupation.

Since then Ibrahim Rugova has been among the champions of an independent Kosovo, and in 1992 he was elected president by the Albanians. The Serbian authorities have not of course recognized the election.

For several years now Ibrahim Rugova has been trying to get the problems of the Kosovo Albanians on the agenda when the war in former Yugoslavia has been up for discussion, but with little success.

When rump Yugoslavia was hit by sanctions in 1992, because the country would not agree to a mediation plan for the war in the former Yugoslavia, Rugova and his party, the Democratic League (LDK) of Kosova, tried to have Kosovo's problems linked to the sanctions. He has worked tirelessly to convince the world that the sanctions against Serbia should only be lifted when a solution has been found in Kosovo. But by agreeing to the Dayton treaty, Serbia had the sanctions eased, and the Albanians of Kosovo have received nothing in return.

[Jastrup] You nevertheless welcomed the Dayton agreement. Why?

[Rugova] I welcomed the Dayton agreement because it stopped the war in Bosnia and much of the human suffering. Of course I would have liked to see Kosovo directly mentioned in the treaty, but now that the war is over there is a chance to tackle other problems in the area—like Kosova.

[Jastrup] If the Dayton agreement is going to be a success, it requires the Serbs' cooperation, so there is a limit to how much the world wants to bother them now. Do you really believe that you have any hope of getting an agreement with the Serbs now?

[Rugova] The Serbs must agree to enter into a dialogue. There is considerable pressure from outside for a start to negotiations with an outside mediator. Our efforts for peace in Europe are recognized.

Even if the sanctions are suspended, there are still opportunities to put pressure on the Serbs. For example, through the integration of Yugoslavia into international monetary and financial institutions.

The Serbs are under political and moral pressure to do something about Kosova. So if they really want to align themselves with the West and if the pressure is kept up, we hope they will give in.

[Jastrup] If the peace in Bosnia holds and the eyes of the world are diverted to other parts of the globe, might Kosovo not also be forgotten?

[Rugova] No, I do not think so. Kosova's problem is very clear and recognized by the United Nations and the United States. And it is a good sign that it looks like there is going to be peace in Bosnia. But we have to wait and see if there are going to be any real changes in Serbia. [Rugova ends]

Ibrahim Rugova talks softly to the interpreter and gives a tired smile from time to time when he hears the same questions he has answered several times already the same day. It is late in the afternoon and he has spent most of it talking—to politicians, journalists, and others who are interested in the Kosovo problem.

Interrupted by an Eastern European urge to chain-smoke—not yet inhibited by advocates of healthy living—he tries to explain why the surrounding world—the West—should take Kosovo's problems seriously:

[Rugova] Kosova is a real problem. If the conflict in Kosova turns into war, it will inevitably draw in Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria. The Albanians are a very scattered people.

[Jastrup] In the last few years we have heard time and again that Kosovo is about to explode, but this has not happened. Have you not cried wolf too many times now to be taken seriously?

[Rugova] The oppression still continues, but we have sacrificed ourselves and only reacted peacefully to Serbian oppression. Our contribution to peace during the last five years has been indispensable, and the international community recognizes this. If Kosova becomes independent, it will create stability in the entire area, because if will link Albanians in the Balkans together, geographically and economically. [Rugova ends]

Peace and Freedom Prize

Ibrahim Rugova is in Denmark to receive the PL [expansion unknown] Fund's Peace and Freedom Prize of 100,000 kroner for his efforts to "bring about the liberation of Kosova from Serbian oppression by peaceful means." He has used the opportunity to meet Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen make sure of Denmark's support in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table.

The 52-year-old specialist in literary theory and literary criticism who will accept the prize from Erling Olsen on Monday [19 February] is the son of a large farmer who was declared an "enemy of the system" and executed by the communists during the last days of World War II. He studied literature in Prishtina, but at the age of 30 received a scholarship to study for one year in Paris.

He took part in founding the LDK following bloody uprisings in Kosovo in 1990 and was elected president of Kosovo in 1992.

In elections to the Albanian parliament, which like Rugova's office is not recognized by the Serbian authorities, the LDK won 96 out of 140 seats.

From the beginning the LDK—with Ibrahim Rugova at its head—has advocated peaceful resistance and civil disobedience. The league has concentrated particularly on building up of Albanian institutions alongside the official Serbian ones. Schools, a health-care system, parliament, and the office of president as well, have been built up despite Serb bans.

Bad Experience

The LDK's goal is to make Kosovo an independent republic. As the first step along the way the LDK has proposed that Kosovo become an independent state under international civil administration.

[Jastrup] Would it not be more realistic to aim at autonomy within Yugoslavia as you had before?

[Rugova] We do not want that. We have been subject to the Serbs for eighty years, and our experience of them is very bad. Their goal is to force us out of Kosova. [Rugova ends]

That tactic seems to have had some success. Nearly 300,000 Albanians have fled Kosovo—primarily to Germany and Scandinavia. They have fled conditions which the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights described in its 1995 report as follows:

"In Kosova continuing discrimination against ethnic Albanians (over 90 percent of the total population) and systematic violations of their fundamental rights continued and intensified in every aspect of daily life throughout 1994.

"'Emergency measures,' legitimized by 36 discriminatory laws, have been put into effect in the area since 1990... As a result of these over 80 percent of Kosovo-Albanians have been fired. In consequence many have been expelled from dwellings to which they have a legal right. The goal seems to be... to create an ethnically 'pure' Kosovo."

The report continues:

"Arbitrary arrests and maltreatment are daily occurrences."

Amnesty International adds in its 1995 report:

"There are daily reports of the maltreatment and torture of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province."

Neither the Helsinki Federation nor Amnesty International were able to report any armed Albanian resistance, but several Albanians admitted to Amnesty that they had smuggled in and distributed weapons "for self-defense."

[Jastrup] Can and will the LDK maintain its peaceful policy?

[Rugova] It is very difficult, but the Albanians know that the alternative is much worse. If we resort to violent means, the Serbs will exterminate us and "cleanse the area" of Albanians. That is their goal.

[Jastrup] Is there agreement within the LDK on the peaceful line?

[Rugova] There are no basic disagreements, but there is debate about whether we should use more radical methods. But these are only discussions. We know that any radicalization is dangerous. As recently as last weekend there was a series of explosions at a refugee center for Serbian refugees from Croatia. It is more than likely that it was the Serbs themselves who did this, so that they would have an alibi for coming down even harder on the Albanians. [Rugova ends]

Serbs in a Free Kosovo

When Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic took away Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and imposed a state of emergency in the area, the excuse was that the Serbs in the area were being oppressed by the Albanians.

[Jastrup] Would you not actually like to be rid of the Serbs in an independent Kosovo?

[Rugova] No that is not the case; that is pure propaganda. In our constitution the Serbs are guaranteed the same rights as everyone else. When we held our parliamentary election, we reserved ten percent of the seats in parliament for the Serb minority, even though they make up only 7 or 8 percent of the population. [Rugova ends]

The Serbs in Kosovo did not make use of their reserved seats. They boycotted the election, just as the Albanians boycotted the official elections.

[Jastrup] The hostility between your peoples is ancient. Can you not understand them if they are afraid of an independent Kosovo?

[Rugova] They are not afraid; they have always had the rest of Yugoslavia behind them. If they had been afraid, they would not have oppressed us. This is a result of Serbian propaganda—we are being demonized.

[Jastrup] I have heard you referred to as "Satan" to the Serbs. [Jastrup ends]

Ibrahim Rugova loses some of his tiredness and bursts out laughing.

[Rugova] Then it must be a soft Satan.

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